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ELECTORAL PRESSURES FOR CHANGE: THE EFFECT OF
POLITICAL REFORM
Introduction
A cartoon in the Asahi Shinbun dated 11 August 1993 shows the leaders of the seven political
parties participating in the Hosokawa coalition government formed two days before. They are
wielding samurai swords and standing triumphant on the inert body of a dinosaur labelled
‘single party control’. One of the leaders is holding a banner that reads: ‘Next is political reform’,
and the caption to the cartoon expresses the following sentiment: ‘By launching [the new
Cabinet], “One Great Task” has been completed’ (Asahi Shinbun, 11 August 1993).
At the time it was easy to regard the formation of the first non-Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP) Cabinet for nearly 38 years as a heroic event. A party mired in corruption, preferring
backstage deals to open government and massively influenced by irresponsible bureaucrats
and self-serving interest groups had been vanquished by a coalition of far-sighted reformers.
These reformers were proposing a coherent programme to democratise and modernise the
political, economic and social systems and practices of Japan. As happens following most
revolutions, however, what ensued was far more messy and confusing, the politics more murky
and the achievements more ambiguous than the initial mood of euphoria would have predicted.
Indeed, within a mere nine months of losing office, the LDP dinosaur had revived, and though
much less powerful than before, was taking its first steps on the road to regaining its dominant
political position.
The Hosokawa Cabinet adumbrated a reform agenda whose principal elements were
deregulation, decentralisation, economic reforms and a radical change to the electoral system
for the House of Representatives. In the event, partly because the tenure of office of his
government was so brief, Hosokawa’s only solid achievement in the area of political reform was
a wholesale rewriting of the electoral law for the Lower House.1  Although, however, this was
arguably the one really major political change that took place in the 1990s, to gauge its effects
is far more problematic. Indeed, it is a central argument of this paper that the effects of
changing the Lower House electoral system have been quite limited, and that the causes of the
most crucial political changes of the 1990s must be sought largely elsewhere. (It is possible, of
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course, that the new electoral system may produce more substantial effects in the future, but
in any case we cannot assume that the new system will not be further revised in the next few
years.)
Conceptualising the politics of the 1990s
For many observers, the predominant impression of Japanese politics in the 1990s has been
one of utter confusion. Political parties have split, amalgamated, changed their names,
switched coalitions, appeared, disappeared, re-appeared – with barely discernible rhyme or
reason. Politicians who were sworn enemies become bosom friends, and bosom friends become
sworn enemies. Ideological difference or similarity seems to have little predictive value in
relation to coalition behaviour. Political leaders whose images are strong show little leadership
when given the opportunity, whereas apparently weak leaders demonstrate an unexpected
capacity to lead (or at least to lead more than was expected of them). Bureaucrats control
politicians, but politicians control bureaucrats, and pressure groups of all kinds both manipu-
late and are manipulated by both bureaucrats and politicians. Superficially at least, Japan’s
political system is a vast amorphous organism, pulsating and constantly changing shape, but
lacking clear direction or internal distinctions that can be readily grasped. Rules exist, but
rarely seem to determine outcomes.
There is, however, a pattern that informs the political events of the 1990s. The fact that
this pattern has been difficult to discern may well relate to the way the problem has been
expressed by various participants and observers of the political process in the 1990s. In the
opinion of Ozawa Ichiro, the most high profile reformer of the decade, the political choice is
between a continuation of single-party dominance (essentially the system up to 1993), and a
two-party alternation. The great advantage of two-party alternation, according to this
argument, is that the electorate is given a genuine choice between two alternative sets of
politicians having different political philosophies and programs. This is democratically
desirable, in that it gives a genuine choice to the electorate. It is also desirable in terms of
getting things done, since with a single party permanently dominant, vested interests make
it exceedingly difficult to change entrenched policies. Such a system has a tendency toward
corruption, toward economic policies distorted by the influence of narrow groups occupying a
strategic position and, in a pithy phrase, ‘crony capitalism’.
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Ozawa did his best to bring into being an alternative party that would be capable of
challenging the LDP. His most impressive effort in this regard was the formation of the
Shinshinto (New Frontier Party), an amalgamation of several pre-existing parties that was
launched in December 1994 but ignominiously collapsed a mere three years later, in December
1997. It reached the height of its popularity at the House of Councillors elections of July 1995,2
but subsequently suffered a steady trickle of defections and was beset by increasingly difficult
problems of internal cohesion. The reasons for all this need not detain us. Whether, given
somewhat different circumstances, the Shinshinto might have developed into an alternative
government to the LDP is academic. The hard fact is that it did not.
Just before the general elections for the House of Representatives held in October 1996,
another serious opposition party, the Minshuto (Democratic Party of Japan: DPJ) was formed,
with aspirations to be an alternative party of government. It too was an amalgamation of
different groups, having a more left-of-centre orientation than the Shinshinto, but most
contemporary observers would probably agree that its chances of forming an alternative
government are substantially slimmer than those of the Shinshinto in its heyday.
On the other hand, an important political innovation of the 1990s (though not entirely
without precedent) is coalition government. We shall examine below the varieties of coalition
government, and the electoral and other conditions that have led to them. But at this point we
need to advance the most important proposition of the paper, namely that the politics of the
1990s may be conceptualised as a clash between two opposing principles.
The first is the principle of single-party dominance, in which the LDP has far more
parliamentary seats than any other party, and other parties, rather than acting as an
opposition, operate without power in a role supportive of the dominant party. A partial example
would be the Hashimoto government between October 1996 and the early months of 1998,
when the Social Democratic Party (SDP, formerly Japan Socialist Party, or JSP) and Sakigake
– both very weak following the October 1996 general elections – lent their support to the LDP
without participating in government. But more broadly, this principle means that power rests
essentially within one political organisation (party), and other parties either act as satellites
round the LDP sun, or maintain a position of impotent opposition (for instance the Japan
Communist Party, or JCP).
The opposing principle is that of a coalition government: that is to say, where different
parties join together in a coalition arrangement, and there is a genuine sharing of political
power between them. Such an arrangement will only take place where the LDP (or, theoreti-
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cally, another dominant party) lacks a parliamentary majority. An example from the middle
of the decade is provided by the LDP–JSP–Sakigake coalition under Prime Minister Murayama
between June 1994 and January 1996. Although from various perspectives this was not the
most impressive of governments, it was one where a variety of political perspectives were
allowed free play, and political debate within government about contentious policy issues
became important.3  It is true, of course, that the experience of the Murayama and subsequent
Hashimoto coalition governments was electorally catastrophic for the Socialists,4  but at the
time the style of government was notably different from what had normally prevailed under
LDP single-party rule.
Our contention is that it is an understanding of the complex process of interaction
between these competing principles that can bring conceptual order into the admittedly highly
confused politics of the 1990s. On the one hand, the LDP, having lost its parliamentary
majority in 1993–94 (as the result of large-scale defections), and having gone into opposition,
set out to re-establish its dominant political position. To a remarkable extent, the party has
been successful in this ambition. By June 1994 it was back in government, as part of a coalition
government; in January 1996 it regained the prime ministership; in the Lower House elections
of October 1996 it won about 30 new seats, while remaining short of a majority; in September
1997 it found itself once again with a Lower House majority in its own right; and by 1999 the
LDP had a fairly comfortable Lower House majority. The one prize that remained elusive was
the regaining of a majority in the House of Councillors, and indeed in the elections to that
House, held in July 1998, the LDP lost seats. Consequently, the LDP can only continue in office
in what the Japanese press describes as a situation of ‘stable government’ (Asahi Shinbun, 10
September 1999), that is if it enters into coalition arrangements with other parties that may
be quite different from it in core constituency, organisational structure and policy preference.5
How then does the present situation differ from that which prevailed between 1955 and
1993, a period which is generally regarded one of single-party dominance? First of all, we have
to enter the caveat that the political system during those years was not unchanging; in
particular, from 1989 the LDP lacked an Upper House majority. But secondly and more
importantly, the 1990s have seen some important developments that have effected major
changes in the way Japanese politics operates.
Arguably the change that has been the most far-reaching in its effects has been the near
demise of the Japan Socialist Party (now Social Democratic Party). In January 1993 the JSP
had 141 (out of 512) seats in the House of Representatives and 73 (out of 252) seats in the House
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of Councillors. By 1999 the corresponding figures for the SDP (same party under a new name)
were 14 and 14. Even though the JSP had enjoyed varying fortunes during the period of LDP
dominance up to the early 1990s, it had always been the leading party of opposition, with
sufficient parliamentary numbers to block constitutional revision (when it teamed with other
smaller parties). More broadly, nobody expected the Socialists to become popular enough to
take power (at least, not on their own). Nevertheless, their presence as a constant veto block,
backed by public sector unions, intellectuals, teachers and others, acted as a balancing force
against the ambitions of right-wing LDP politicians desirous of reversing certain aspects of the
Occupation settlement of the late 1940s and early 1950s. Issues of peace and war were most
prominent, and a kind of tacit agreement ensured the integrity of the Japan–US security
relationship, but maintained strict limitations on Japan’s use of military force.
In essence, this was an agreement premised on the continuance of the Cold War. When
the Cold War ended, the rationale for such a balance to continue was weakened. By ironic
circumstances, the Socialists, riding high in the polls at the outset of the 1990s, were rapidly
declining in electoral strength just as the opportunity came to participate in a series of coalition
governments with varying partners. This in turn accelerated the process of decline. Many of
their votes plainly went to the Communists, who continued to act like an opposition and have
been gaining in electoral strength from a low base. The main point for our argument, however,
is that a party that for years had represented a limited but effective veto force, had by the late
1990s almost disappeared.
As a result of the near-demise of the Socialist Party and the return to strength of the LDP,
there has been a distinct but subtle shift in the nature of political debate across a range of
issues. The trend that has been accorded the largest amount of publicity – and occasioned
disquiet in some quarters – is a perceptible shift to the right of the balance of opinion in the
political class. One telling example is the recent decision of the parliament (July 1999) to
conduct a debate on the 1946 Constitution for the first time in its history.6
On the other hand, there is evidence of an opening up of debate on a range of issues where
outcomes are difficult to classify as ‘right wing’. For instance, the Freedom of Information Act
passed through Parliament in its 145th session that ended on 13 August 1999. That session
proved one of the most varied, as well as active, parliamentary sessions of recent years, and
included, among others, an ambitious bill to cut back the number of government ministries
from 23 to 13.7  It is beyond the scope of this paper to develop a full analysis of why the most
recent parliamentary session should have been so active. To explain it would involve
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considering the narrower spectrum of opinion within the political class, as well as the
substantial rewriting of the political agenda that began with the Hosokawa Cabinet in 1993
(although it is possible to trace the changes to an earlier time than that). The pressures caused
by the Asian economic crisis and various foreign policy problems would also need to be taken
into account.
Coalition government in the 1990s
We now need, however, to enter into a discussion of the second principle of Japanese politics
in the 1990s, that of coalition government. There have been a variety of coalition arrangements
since 1993, but what is significant is that despite the LDP’s successes in clawing back dominant
political power since 1994, it has remained dependent upon entering into coalition with other
parties in order to secure passage through parliament of its legislative programme. Up until
September 1997 this was because it lacked a majority in the House of Representatives, and the
Lower House is of course the more important of the two. But crucially, the LDP has lacked a
majority in the House of Councillors ever since its defeat in the Upper House elections of July
1989, in the aftermath of the Recruit Scandal.
Until the upheaval of 1989, it had been widely assumed that the House of Councillors was
of little significance for either government or opposition. Indeed, with the LDP in control of both
houses, as it was between 1955 and 1989, this was largely the case. In law, however, the Upper
House has the power to reject legislation sent to it from the Lower House (except for the budget,
treaties and the designation of a new prime minister). While the House of Representatives may
override an Upper House rejection if it does so by a two-thirds majority, governments do not
normally have a Lower House majority as large as that.8
‘Stable government’ relies on a majority in both houses of parliament, and this dictates
the need to create coalition regimes. Apart from the minority Hata government, which lasted
a mere nine weeks between April and June 1994, every government of the 1990s has enjoyed
a Lower House majority (although some have been more comfortable than others). On the other
hand, several governments have lacked an Upper House majority. This was an embarrassingly
difficult problem for the Kaifu (LDP) government at the time of the Gulf crisis and war in 1990–
91. At that time the LDP Secretary-General, Ozawa Ichiro, attempted to make deals with
certain parties in opposition (especially the Komeito) in order to secure Upper House approval
of a peacekeeping operations bill. This did not succeed at the time, although it led to an
agreement after the war was over, in 1992.
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It is instructive to examine the degree to which the variously composed governments
from 1993 were ‘secure’ in terms of their majority (of lack of it) in the two houses. This can be
seen from the tables attached as appendices to this paper, but the following is a brief summary.
The figures throw considerable light on the rationale for the formation of various kinds of
coalition.
The Miyazawa (LDP) government as of January 1993 controlled 53.5 per cent of Lower
House seats, but only 42.1 per cent of Upper House seats (Table A1.2). Following substantial
defections from the LDP in June 1993 and the defeat in the House of Representatives elections
in July, a coalition government was formed under Hosokawa Morihiro, consisting of seven
parties and one Upper House grouping, but excluding the LDP. The Hosokawa government had
a bare majority (50.7 per cent) of Lower House seats, and 52.0 per cent of seats in the Upper
House (Table A1.3). Even though it could control both houses, its majority was so thin in both
that legislative success was premised on the maintenance of greater parliamentary discipline
among its own often squabbling ranks than it was readily able to command.
The next government, headed by Hata Tsutomu, was, as we have seen, in a minority in
both houses (35.6 per cent of seats in the House of Representatives) (Table A1.4). It was
tolerated for some nine weeks essentially because a government was required in order to pass
the budget, which had been delayed. Many observers expressed astonishment at the formation,
and subsequent ability to survive, of the three-party coalition governments (LDP, JSP and
Sakigake), led successively by Murayama Tomiichi (JSP) and Hashimoto Ryutaro (LDP),
between June 1994 and the first Lower House elections under a reformed electoral system in
October 1996. The LDP and JSP were ancient enemies, so that an alliance between them
appeared to go against nature. When, however, we inspect the parliamentary arithmetic of
these governments, we see that their formation and maintenance made a great deal of sense
from the perspective of the participants. A month after the formation of the Murayama
government (July 1994), it commanded 57.8 per cent of seats in the House of Representatives,
and approximately 63.5 per cent of House of Councillors seats (see Table A1.5).9  The figures
changed little over 18 months of that government (58.5 per cent and 63.9 per cent in January
1995 (Table A1.6); 56.9 per cent and 60.7 per cent in August 1995 (Table A1.7)).
When the prime ministership was taken over by Hashimoto (and thus the LDP) in
January 1996, the figures initially remained much the same (57.3 per cent and 59.5 per cent)
(see Table A1.8). The general elections for the House of Representatives held in October 1996,
under the new election system, produced, on the other hand, a more complicated situation. The
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JSP (now the SDP), split shortly before the elections, leading to the formation of the Minshuto
(Democratic Party of Japan, or DPJ). As a result, the Socialists were reduced to a mere rump
of 15 seats. Moreover the Sakigake party was almost wiped out as a result of the election,
ending up with only two Lower House seats. The upshot was that the SDP and Sakigake
remained in alliance with the LDP but did not participate in government. The LDP gained seats
in the election but not enough to form a government in its own right. It could only survive
provided it was able to rely on the parliamentary support of the two parties that had now left
the government. Thus the Hashimoto government, as of November 1996, now commanded only
46.6 per cent of Lower House seats, although with Socialist and Sakigake seats added, the
figure rose to a bare majority: 51.0 per cent. In the House of Councillors, the government as such
was now short of a majority (44.0 per cent), but was much better off when the votes of the two
parties supporting it were added (56.7 per cent) (Table A1.9).
Over the next year and a half the position of the Hashimoto government in the House of
Representatives gradually improved, largely as a result of defections to the LDP from other
parties on the principle of ‘getting with the strength’. By the end of September 1997, Japan’s
largest political party had just 50 per cent of the seats in the Lower House, and when the
support of the SDP and Sakigake is added, the total rises to 53.4 per cent. A majority still eluded
it in the Upper House, where on its own it commanded 44.4 per cent of the seats. With the seats
of the two supporting parties, it held 54.0 per cent of the Upper House (Table A1.10).
What is evident from these figures is that even though the parliamentary position of the
LDP was improving, the Hashimoto government was in a substantially less comfortable
parliamentary position for the year following the October 1996 general elections than in the
months preceding it. The LDP continued to attract a trickle of defectors from other parties, and
by January 1998 the picture looked rosier. The LDP controlled 51.8 per cent of Lower House
seats in 1998 (55.2 per cent when adding the seats belonging to its two supporting parties ), and
47.2 per cent of Upper House seats (56.7 per cent when we include SDP and Sakigake seats)
(Table A1.11). These defections were severely disrupted by the results of the July 1998
elections for half the seats in the House of Councillors when the Hashimoto government
suffered the blame for the banking indebtedness crisis, the economic recession and rising levels
of unemployment.
With the consequent resignation of Hashimoto as prime minister, his successor, Obuchi
Keizo, began his government controlling a slightly improved majority in the House of
Representatives (52.6 per cent of total seats), but a very poor position in the House of
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Councillors (42.1 per cent) (Table A1.12). The SDP and Sakigake had abandoned their support
for the LDP government before the elections, so that the LDP was now once more on its own
in government. The period of coalition arrangements crossing the Left–Right divide appeared
to be over.
The Obuchi government thus started out with an unsustainable parliamentary position.
It was likely to be severely frustrated in attempts to realise its legislative program, being so
far short of a majority in the Upper House. Such a situation, especially for a government facing
an economic crisis, called for the forging of a new coalition alliance. This was, in part at least,
accomplished with the signing in November 1998 of a coalition agreement with Ozawa’s Jiyuto
(Liberal Party). The Jiyuto had been formed by a small group of Ozawa loyalists following the
collapse of the Shinshinto, and advocated relatively radical policies of political reform. The new
coalition gave to the Obuchi government a cast iron majority in the House of Representatives
(59.6 per cent) – although this was still not large enough to override obstruction by the House
of Councillors. The Jiyuto, however, was weak in the Upper House, and the two parties together
accounted for only 46.0 per cent of seats there (Table A1.13).
This situation explained the negotiations that took place in August and September 1999,
with a view to forming a three-party coalition government including the Komeito as well as the
LDP and Jiyuto. If this coalition materialises, the Obuchi government will enjoy a comfortable
majority in the House of Councillors, and a massive majority (for the first time more than the
two thirds required to revise the Constitution)10  in the House of Representatives. On the other
hand, other parties have found the Komeito (with its monolithic and cohesive organisation
closely linked with the Soka Gakkai Buddhist sect) difficult to work with in the past.11  It
appears that the negotiations have been proving difficult, with the Komeito and Jiyuto taking
opposed positions on the question of reducing the number of Lower House members, among
other issues.
This suggests that while progress with re-establishing the fact of the LDP’s dominance
has been substantial, it can only be achieved through the construction of coalitions with other
parties, which may well prove awkward partners. The 1990s have given politicians a good deal
of experience with coalition government, including its requirement for compromise in relation
to both policy and the structure of policymaking. In terms of the two principles proposed earlier
in this paper, while aspiring to single-party dominance, LDP politicians are facing the practical
reality of having to adjust to the much more demanding reality of coalition arrangements. This
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has begun to create a more dynamic and less stereotyped policymaking environment than that
which prevailed under the 1955 political system with its Cold War dichotomies.
The impact of electoral reform
What part, then, has electoral reform played in the political process of the 1990s? It has seemed
necessary to analyse in some detail the political dynamics of the decade before dealing with the
effects of electoral reform, simply in order to distinguish changes caused by reforming the
electoral system from changes whose causes lie elsewhere.
As suggested earlier in the paper, the principal concrete achievement of the Hosokawa
government was reform of the electoral system for the House of Representatives, and
associated tightening of the laws related to political corruption. Even though the relevant laws
did not come onto the statute book until late in 1994 when the Murayama Cabinet was in office,
the shape of the reforms were basically decided, at times through difficult negotiation and
compromise between contending interests, by the Hosokawa Cabinet itself. It needs to be
stressed, however, that the new system was in a fundamental way the product of compromise,
and turned out to be far less radical in its impact that some reformers expected and hoped.
In order to explain the rationale for this last assertion, we need first to give a brief
description of the former system, followed by a short examination of the new system, including
the way it worked in the elections of October 1996.
The former electoral system for the House of Representatives was used in every election
between 1947 and 1993 (a total of 18 general elections). A rather similar system operated
between the 1920s and the war. Although some details were changed from time to time, the
essence of it was that each elector had a single, nontransferable vote, but each constituency
elected several members. For most of the period of the system’s validity, there were roughly
equal numbers of three-, four- and five-member constituencies, though latterly a small number
of two- and six-member constituencies were created. It was a system based on SNTV in MMCs
(single nontransferable vote in multi-member constituencies).
Broadly speaking, the system resulted in certain political consequences.12  First, al-
though this was not a system of proportional representation, by comparison with either the
British or Australian Lower House electoral systems, it contained a strong proportional
element. This was because since a candidate might well be elected with a mere 15 or 20 per cent
of the total vote in a constituency, minority parties commanding approximately that proportion
1.11
No. 301 March 2000
of the vote across a number of constituencies might expect to maintain a significant parliamen-
tary representation.13
Second, in the case of a large party such as the LDP, which might expect to win several
seats in particular constituencies, different candidates of the same party in the same
constituency were competing with each other as much as they were competing with candidates
of other parties. In the particular case of the LDP this accentuated (although it probably did
not cause) factional divisions within the party. It also led to a situation where each candidate
maintained a personal support group (koenkai) of constituency electors for the purpose of
promoting his (or her) campaign, but had weak or nonexistent links with the party as such.14
The central party organisation had an important role in ensuring that not too many candidates
bearing the LDP label stood in any particular constituency. In this, it was generally effective.
Third, competition between different candidates of the same party seems to have
encouraged what in Japan is delicately called ‘money politics’, or in stronger words, corruption.
In part because of the electoral system and in part because of lax anti-corruption laws,
astonishing amounts of money were spent on elections.
Fourth, however, it is arguable that the often intense intraparty competition stimulated
by the electoral system acted to increase the LDP vote. Candidates for smaller parties
(including the Socialists), mainly standing as sole candidates for their party in their constitu-
encies, would in many cases scarcely need to campaign, since they could rely on their
organisational backers (e.g. labour unions) to deliver a sufficient proportion of the vote to get
elected. This, together with the fact that the various opposition parties were incapable of
combining into a single party, greatly favoured the LDP.
Fifth, the former electoral system was marred by severe problems of malapportionment.
Migration of people from the countryside to the cities was inadequately reflected in constitu-
ency boundary correction. Although palliative corrections were made from time to time, there
were periods when the discrepancy in the value of a vote between the most favoured and least
favoured constituency was more than four to one. By favouring the rural areas, this
malapportionment (the ‘negative gerrymander’) was advantageous to the LDP.
The advertised purposes of abandoning SNTV in MMCs and moving to a new system were
to get rid of money politics, shift the emphasis of electoral campaigning from personality-based
appeals to appeals based on policy choices, and create a politics that should be genuinely
competitive between parties. Some advocates, notably Ozawa, consciously wished to move to
a system of two-party alternating politics (Ozawa 1994:66). What actually emerged, however,
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was the hybrid product of intense bargaining and compromise between different political
interests and principles. Parties on the conservative side of the spectrum in the main wished
for a system predominantly based on single-member constituencies and first-past-the-post
voting, whereas the smaller parties of the centre and left wished to maximise the number of
seats that should be determined by proportional representation.
The result was a compromise between the two, with the weighting, however, toward the
former. The total seat number was reduced from 511 to 500, of which 300 were to be elected from
single-member constituencies, and the remaining 200 from 11 regional blocs by the d’Hondt
system of proportional representation. Each elector was to have two votes, one for each type
of seat. The same candidate could stand for both constituencies. If elected in both, he or she
would take the seat won in a single-member constituency, so that the regional bloc seats came
to be seen as a kind of second best. The regional bloc seats, however, constituted a crucial second
chance for candidates unable to muster the plurality required to win a single-member seat.
Moreover, in a peculiar arrangement, parties could distribute of seats among their candidates
in the regional PR blocs depending on the candidates’ relative margins of defeat in the single-
member constituencies that are located in the same area as the regional bloc.15
The effect of this arrangement, even though not all parties took advantage of it, was to
bring back an important characteristic of the former (SNTV in MMCs) electoral system for the
Lower House. Under the old system, a candidate commanding a relatively minor proportion of
votes in a given constituency was often able to be elected, given that the first three, four, or five
candidates in terms of their proportion of the vote, were declared elected. The ‘margin of defeat’
rule in the new electoral system in effect made it possible once again for a candidate who failed
to win a seat in a single-member constituency to win a seat in a regional bloc depending on how
well the candidate had performed in the single-member constituency. This was neither a true
first-past-the-post, nor a true proportional representation system, but an underhand way of
resuscitating one of the key elements of the former system.
Ozawa had been trenchant in his criticism of this aspect of the old electoral arrange-
ments. In his words:
In the present electoral system, each district throughout the country elects from three to
five representatives. Invariably, at least one opposition candidate wins a seat even if he
never appears in public … Extraordinarily, it is the opposition parties that enjoy the
greatest security in this setup. The largest, the Socialist Party, seems convinced that there
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is no need to go through the struggle of actually campaigning to win an election. The
Socialists will never rule, left as they are. What is more, they seem content with that. It
makes one wonder why they are a party at all. It is the multi-seat district system that has
so indulged the opposition parties, particularly the Socialists. As a consequence of their
weakness, the LDP has been assured of its semi-permanent rule so that it, too, has become
immobilized. (Ozawa 1994:64)
Conclusion
Since this was written, the Socialists have been more or less eliminated from the political
picture. Nevertheless, it seems evident that the much-heralded electoral reforms of 1993–94
have been much less radical in their effect than appeared at first sight. Apart from the technical
factors outlined above, the tightening of the anti-corruption laws does not seem to have had a
great effect of eliminating money politics, even though the State now provides a proportion of
electoral funding to parties. The koenkai system still reigns supreme, and indeed the need in
single-member constituencies to win a plurality (not just 20 per cent of the vote) has led to ever
bigger koenkai. The alternative opposition parties formed since the change in the system have
either collapsed (Shinshinto), or failed to take off (DPJ).
In the absence of a single viable opposition party, the single-member constituencies are
extremely advantageous to the LDP, and in this sense privilege the single-party dominance
principle that this paper discussed earlier. The less numerous regional PR blocs are where
smaller parties are able to carve out a niche for themselves, but elements in the ruling
establishment would like to reduce their number still further. On their own, these regional
blocs are incapable of privileging the alternative principle that we advanced earlier, that of
coalition government. Indeed, if the Japanese parliament were a single-chamber parliament,
the LDP would have re-established its political dominance fair and square. The House of
Councillors, however, has proved to be a very significant actor in the politics of Japan after the
LDP defeat in the Upper House elections of 1989. A decade later, moreover, it remains the
principal institution compelling the Obuchi government to enter into coalition arrangements.
This is ironic, since the electoral system for the House of Councillors is even less reconstructed
than that of the House of Representatives. But the electorate is sophisticated enough to be
adept at using Upper House elections as a means of checking governmental power without
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actually removing the LDP from power. Moreover, given that only half of the Upper House
members are renewed at each election, regaining control of it cannot happen quickly.16
The 1990s have not led, as reformers earlier in the decade hoped, to a system based on
two-party alternation, and it seems unlikely that this can be achieved in Japan. It has led,
however, to coalition governments and a challenging of the dominance of a single party. Even
though there is absolutely no guarantee of the future success of this challenge, it seems
currently the best guarantee of a healthier political system. Faced with economic crisis in the
late 1990s, as well as difficult issues to resolve in the areas of foreign policy, the future of social
welfare and the structure of government, the record of successive governments has been mixed.
Nevertheless, the role of parliament in the promotion of reform across a range of areas has
become more lively and vigorous, and legislative innovation makes it, not before time, an
institution to watch.
The continuance of such a healthy trend is not guaranteed. Neither is the continuance
of political balance guaranteed, since the dangers of a radical shift of the centre of gravity to
the nationalist Right are real. Given the weakening of the traditional Left, right-wing
politicians are showing signs of flexing their ideological muscles with greater freedom than
before. Electoral reform has had only a limited impact on these issues. But even though the
electoral system remains to a very large extent unreconstructed, the electorate holds in its
hands the one possibility of enforcing a democratic system of checks and balances against
excesses of political power and ambition: that of forcing governments to enter into coalitions
and thus take other views into account.
Notes
1 The relevant laws, including a revision of laws relating to corrupt practices in electoral
campaigns, did not come onto the statute books until late in 1994, well after the demise
of the Hosokawa government, but it was that government that negotiated the basic
agreement to change the system.
2 The Shinshinto polled 30.75 per cent of the vote in the national constituency and 26.47
per cent of the vote in the prefectural constituencies. This surpassed the LDP vote
percentages, which were 27.29 per cent in the national constituency, and 25.40 per
cent in the prefectural constituencies. The LDP still ended up with substantially more
seats (107 as against 56 for the Shinshinto) because only half the seats were being
renewed (Asahi Nenkan, 1996, pp. 255–6).
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3 For only the second time in Japanese political history, the prime minister was a
Socialist, and the deputy prime minister, Kono Yohei, was the only president of the
LDP not to become prime minister.
4 Murayama notoriously abandoned long-held Socialist rejection of the Self-Defence
Forces, the Japan–US Security Treaty, the national anthem and national flag. This,
in all probability, was the primary cause for the later loss of much of his party’s core
constituency.
5 In September 1999 Prime Minister Obuchi was actively negotiating with the Komeito
to form a three-party coalition of LDP, Jiyuto (Ozawa’s Liberal Party) and Komeito.
6 Other important examples are the legalisation of the flag and anthem (both having
right-wing connotations) in August 1999, and the passage of a wiretapping bill in the
same month. It is debatable how far a move to the right among the political class is
reflected in the electorate as a whole. Much has been made of the election of Ishihara
Shintaro – a celebrated right winger – as governor of Tokyo prefecture in April 1999.
But Ishihara only won 30.6 per cent of the total vote in 1999 (1,646,549) against five
significant opponents who split the vote between them, as against 43.9 per cent of the
total vote (2,336,359) in 1975, when he came second (Asahi Nenkan, 1976, p. 259; Asahi
Shinbun, 12 April 1999). (The figures for the 1999 election are provisional, with 97 per
cent of the vote counted.)
7 For a comprehensive list of the bills passed in the 145th session of parliament, see
Asahi Shinbun 13 and 14 August 1999. The success rate of government bills was 87
per cent.
8 Constitution, Article 59, paragraph 2. In paragraph 3 of the same article, there is a
provision for the calling of a joint committee of both houses, but this is not a fail-safe
method of ensuring the passage of legislation from a government’s point of view. For
a fuller discussion, see Stockwin (1999:113–16).
9 Loyalties in the Upper House were fluid at the time, so the figure is approximate.
10 Article 96 of the 1946 Constitution requires a concurring majority of two-thirds of the
members of each house of parliament voting separately, followed by a simple majority
in a referendum of the people.
11 One important cause for the collapse of the Shinshinto in December 1996 was the
failure of the Komeito elements to assimilate fully into that artificially created party.
12 This is not to argue that such consequences were inevitable, but rather that in the
particular political circumstances of Japan between 1947 and 1993 these conse-
quences were observable.
13 By contrast the Democratic Labor Party maintained a little under 20 per cent of the
vote in several constituencies for the House of Representatives in Victoria,  Australia,
between the late 1950s and the early 1970s, but never won a single Lower House seat.
14 This need not necessarily be seen as an inevitable consequence of SNTV in MMCs. It
is possible to imagine a situation where the central party organisation coordinated the
campaigns of its several candidates in the same constituency, dividing up the
constituency into districts in such a way as to optimise the effectiveness of the party
vote and avoid vote wastage. The fact is, however, that this did not happen in Japan.
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15 For details of how this worked, see Stockwin (1999:130–1).
16 The remarkable significance of the House of Councillors during the Obuchi govern-
ment was stressed by Sarah Hyde in the ‘Survey of Domestic Politics, 1998–99’,
delivered at the seventh annual Japanese Politics Colloquium, University of Birming-
ham, 7–9 September 1999.
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Appendix
Table A1.1 Checklist of coalition governments in the 1990s
Prime Minister participating parties dates
Lower House elections, July 1993








Hata The above parties, minus: April – June 94
JSP and Sakigake
Murayama LDP June 94 – July 95
JSP
Sakigake
Upper House elections, July 1995
Murayama LDP July 95 – Jan. 96
JSP
Sakigake
Hashimoto LDP Jan. – Oct. 96
JSP
Sakigake
Lower House elections, October 1996
Hashimoto LDP
[JSP]          -supporting Oct. 96 – 98
[Sakigake]  gov’t but not in it
Upper House elections, July 1998
Obuchi LDP
Liberal Party (Jiyuto) Jan. 99 ———
Obuchi Above parties + Komeito Sept.– Oct. 99———-
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Table A1.3 Parliamentary seat breakdown by party, 6 August 1993
[Hosokawa Morihiro, prime minister from 9 August]









Minkairen (Rengo) –   11
Niin Club – 5
JCP  15 11
Independent 10 6
Total seats 511 252
Total gov’t seats 259 131
Note: Parties in bold = government parties.
Source: Asahi Nenkan, 1994, p. 118.
Table A1.2 Parliamentary seat breakdown by party, 20 January 1993
[Miyazawa Kiichi, prime minister]











Total  seats 512 252
Total gov’t seats 274 106
Note: Parties in bold = government parties
Source: Asahi Nenkan, 1994, p. 116.
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Table A1.4 Parliamentary seat breakdown by party, 26 April 1994













Total gov’t seats 182
Note: * An amalgam of Shinseito, Kaikaku, DSP, Shinto Club, Liberal Party, and Kaikaku no kai. The
JSP and Sakigake defected from the coalition as a result of the formation of Kaishin,  which
excluded them.
Parties in bold = government parties.
Source: Asahi Shinbun, 26 April 1994.
Table A1.5 Parliamentary seat breakdown, 18 July 1994
[Murayama Tomiichi, prime minister]














Total seats 511 252
Total gov’t seats 295 160 [+?]
Note: Parties in bold = government parties.
Source: Asahi Nenkan, 1995, p. 248.
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Table A1.6 Parliamentary seat breakdown, 20 January 1995
[Murayama Tomiichi, prime minister]













Total seats 511 252
Total gov’t seats 299 161
Notes: * An alliance of Shinshinto and Komeito-derived members in the Upper House; parties in bold
= government parties.
Source: Asahi Nenkan, 1996, p. 241.
Table A1.7 Parliamentary seat breakdown, 4 August 1995
[Murayama Tomiichi, prime minister]








Minshu no kai 5
Niin Club 4





Total seats 511 252
Total gov’t seats 291 153
Note: Parties in bold = government parties.
Source: Asahi Nenkan, 1996, p 244.
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Table A1.8 Parliamentary seat breakdown, 20 January 1996
[Hashimoto Ryutaro, prime minister]








Shimin Forum 8 4
Shin Shakaito 2 3
Niin Club 4
Mushozoku no kai 2
Jiyu Rengo 2 2
Independent 5 2
vacancy 14
Total seats 511 252
Total gov’t seats 293 150
Note: Parties in bold = government parties.
Source: Asahi Nenkan, 1997, p. 175.
Formation of Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ –  Minshuto), September 1996
First HR elections under new electoral system, October 1996
Table A1.9 Parliamentary seat breakdown, 29 November 1996
[Hashimoto Ryutaro, prime minister]




DPJ (Minshuto) 52 (DPJ/Shinryokufukai) 14








Total seats 500 252
Total gov’t seats 238 111
Total 3-party alliance seats 255 143
Notes: Parties in bold = government parties; parties underlined = parties supporting the government,
but not taking office.
Source: Asahi Nenkan, 1997, p 180.
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Table A1.10 Parliamentary seat breakdown, 29 September 1997
[Hashimoto Ryutaro, prime minister]





SDP (JSP) 15 21
JCP 26 14
Taiyoto (Sun Party) 10 3
Niin Club 4
Mushozoku no kai 5




Total seats 500 252
Total gov’t seats 250 112
Total 3-party alliance seats 267 136
Notes: Parties in bold = government Parties; parties underlined = parties supporting the government,
but not taking office.
Source: Asahi Nenkan, 1998, p. 179.
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Collapse of Shinshinto, December 1997
Formation of Jiyuto (Liberal Party) by Ozawa Ichiro, December 1997
Table A1.11 Parliamentary seat breakdown, 12 January 1998
[Hashimoto Ryutaro, prime minister]
House of Representatives House of Councillors
LDP 259 119
Minyuren  98 41
Heiwa Kaikaku 46
Komei 25
Jiyuto   42 12
JCP   26 14
SDP (JSP) 15 21
Sakigake  2 3






Total seats 500 252
Total gov’t seats 259 119
Total 3-party alliance seats 276 143
Notes: Parties in bold = government parties; parties underlined = parties supporting the government,
but not taking office.
Source: Asahi Nenkan, 1999, p. 171.
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Expansion of DPJ, absorbing other groups, April 1998
House of Councillors elections, July 1998
Table A1.12 Parliamentary seat breakdown, 30 July 1998
[Obuchi Keizo, prime minister]
House of Representatives House of Councillors
LDP 263 106
DPJ   92 55
Heiwa Kaikaku 47
Komei 24
Jiyuto   40 12
JCP   26 23
SDP 14 14






Total seats 500 252
Total gov’t seats 263 106
Note: Seats in bold = government seats.
Source: Asahi Nenkan, 1999, p. 174.
Re-emergence of Komeito as a single party, November 1998
Table A1.13 Parliamentary seat breakdown, 27 November 1998
[Obuchi Keizo, prime minister]







Mushozoku no kai 5




Total seats 500 252
Total gov’t seats 298 116
Note: Seats in bold = government seats
Source: Asahi Nenkan, 1999, p. 177.
12







Pressures on the MOF in the 1990s ..................................................... 2.6
The financial supervisory agency (FSA): independent but
initially constrained .............................................................................. 2.8
From relational to rule-based regulation ............................................ 2.11




Figure 2.1 Establishment of the financial supervisory agency
(FSA) (22 June 1998) ...................................................... 2.9
Figure 2.2 Japan’s new financial regulatory structure
(October 23, 1998) ........................................................ 2.14
Figure 2.3 Planned changes in the financial regulatory
structure (July 2000) ...................................................... 2.21
FIGURES
THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE (MOF) AT THE CROSSROADS
Introduction
Since the collapse of a speculative asset bubble in 1991, Japanese banks have been burdened
with enormous amounts of nonperforming loans. The failure of the Ministry of Finance (MOF)
to tackle this problem aggressively had grave repercussions as macroeconomic policy mis-
takes sank the economy into prolonged recession and exacerbated the magnitude of bad bank
loans. A full-blown financial crisis hit in 1997, following the collapse of the nation’s tenth
largest bank and the fourth largest securities firm, and continued until late 1998.
Once cited as the most capable technocracy in the world, the MOF was implicated in this
regulatory breakdown and the ensuing crisis. As a result, the Diet transferred the ministry’s
inspection and supervisory authority over private sector finance to a newly created Financial
Supervisory Agency in June 1998. A distinctive characteristic of Japan’s system of financial
regulation, however, has long been its overwhelming reliance on informal means to achieve
policy goals. The Ministry of Finance (MOF), entrusted with the regulation of private sector
finance until June 1998, sat at the intersection of a dense and pervasive web of ties extending
to financial institutions, the Diet and other government agencies. These ties involved opaque
and exclusionary relationships that blurred lines between public and private actors. The
change in formal organisational structures brought about by the June 1998 transfer was
therefore on its own not sufficient for effecting far-reaching change. A shift in the primary
orientation of government authorities from promoters and coordinators to monitors and
prudential regulators required changes in both the formal and informal institutions of
governance.
This paper argues that the October 1998 Financial Revitalisation Law and related bills
provided the necessary complement to earlier reform of formal regulatory structures by
displacing informal institutions of problem resolution with universally extending legislative
schemes. Moreover, this legislative package effectively severed the network of relational ties
that had inhibited more aggressive tackling of the nation’s nonperforming loan problem.1  In
these ways, the financial revitalisation package effected an almost revolutionary shift from
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a system of opaque relationship-centred financial regulation to one of objective and transpar-
ent rules-based regulation.
This paper first reviews the pressures that came to bear on the MOF in the 1990s and
led to change in formal regulatory structures. It then highlights the limitations of reform
carried out only at the formal institutional level. The paper next turns to identify those
provisions in the Financial Revitalisation Law and related bills that empowered the FSA to
act for the first time as a truly effective prudential regulator and that fundamentally altered
the dynamics surrounding financial regulation in Japan. Finally, the paper considers the
implications of recent reform in the financial regulatory structures for the MOF’s informal
relational ties in other areas and the financial policymaking process in general.
Pressures on the MOF in the 1990s
From 1991 to 1995, Japan’s general economic downturn – rather than the large amount of
nonperforming loans held by Japanese banks – captured the attention of the voting public and
topped the MOF’s policy agenda. Within the ministry, the nonperforming loan problem was
perceived as a reflection of problems with corporate Japan, rather than indicative of problems
in the banking sector in particular (Author interview with MOF official, 1999). When bank
inspections by MOF officials in 1992 revealed that some banks were creating paper companies
as temporary havens for nonperforming assets, the MOF decided to look the other way.2
Optimistic about the prospects for an economic rebound and operating under the assumption
that an improved business environment would turn such bad assets into good, ministry
officials viewed the creation of paper companies as a reasonable ‘interim measure’. With such
a measure, revealing the true magnitude of the nonperforming loan problem to the public was
unnecessary and banks could continue to serve as a buffer between corporate Japan and the
real economy. Depositor panic was also staved off.
Disclosure to the public of the severity of the nonperforming loan problem would also
have jeopardised the MOF’s position as a largely autonomous decision maker in this policy
sector. While the Diet necessarily approved all financial legislation, the structure of the
nation’s electoral system and paucity of legislative staff long gave national elected repre-
sentatives incentives to focus their political resources in times of perceived financial stability
on more locally based niches of the economy. The MOF had therefore been entrusted with
much discretion in filling in the details of broad and vaguely worded laws with ministerial
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regulations and administrative notices. Private sector actors were given written notifications
or informal verbal instructions from the ministry – a practice known as ‘administrative
guidance’ (gyosei shido).
The economy did not rebound, however, and the magnitude of nonperforming loans
ballooned in the ensuing years. The protracted decline in land prices and the stock index also
meant that the value of collateral continued to drop along with the value of bank equity
holdings. By 1995 the mounting nonperforming asset problems plaguing the jusen (nonbank
housing and loan corporations financially imperilled with the collapse of the bubble) made
their collapse imminent without government support. If simply allowed to fold, however,
some of the jusen’s financiers – most notably the nokyo agricultural cooperatives – would also
fail. Due to the political clout of the agriculture lobby, this was unacceptable to the LDP and
the use of public funds appeared the only solution.
The MOF’s sudden announcement to the public of the severe nature of the jusen problem
and the need for taxpayer money to resolve the problem led to a major public outcry, however.
Within an atmosphere of unprecedented political volatility accompanying the end of nearly
40 years of uninterrupted rule by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and in the midst of
economic recession, any request for the use of public funds was politically sensitive. The
public’s perception that regulatory breakdown had been spurred by collusion further height-
ened the political stakes. Numerous jusen had employed retired MOF bureaucrats on their
boards, for example, revealing close ties with the ministry.
In an attempt to stem the public outcry, the three-party government coalition comprised
of the LDP, Sakigake and Social Democratic parties stipulated that discussion of MOF reform
would be a condition for debating the jusen resolution package in the Diet. For some time, the
LDP managed to temper its coalition partners’ demands for the actual removal of authority
from the MOF. In October 1996, however, the LDP shifted its position to favour the transfer
elsewhere of the MOF’s inspection and supervisory authorities over private sector finance.
With general elections approaching, the stakes were raised for appearing to be soft on the
MOF.
In March 1997, bills to establish a new and independent financial regulatory agency
were submitted to the Diet and, in June 1997, legislation providing for the creation of such an
agency in 1998 was passed. In these ways, the environment of increased political volatility,
combined with the revelation of regulatory breakdown and alleged collusion between the
MOF and financial industry, gave rise to a change in formal regulatory structures.
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The financial supervisory agency (FSA): independent but initially
constrained
On 22 June 1998, the Financial Supervisory Agency commenced business as an independent
agency attached to the Prime Minister’s Office and the remnants of the MOF’s Banking and
Securities Bureaus were merged into a single Financial System Planning Bureau (see
Figure 2.1). The transfer of supervisory and inspection functions to the FSA was an important
development. In addition to private sector finance, the MOF had overseen many other areas
– notably budgetmaking and taxation – and had assumed the lead role in monetary and
exchange rate policy. Bank inspections received very low institutional priority in the MOF
and supervision of the sector was always carried out in the context of discussions about the
economy as a whole. In contrast, the newly created FSA had a single mandate: to supervise
financial institutions.
 Yet, the agency was constrained in its ability to exploit this positive institutional
development. These constraints were three-fold. First, in the absence of a credibly funded
systematic scheme for dealing with bank failures, the FSA faced significant impediments to
adopting a tougher stance toward banks. Judgments about asset values necessarily contain a
subjective element, and any reversal of the MOF’s overly optimistic judgments on the financial
condition of banks would have plunged numerous institutions into insolvency.3  This, in turn,
would have spurred panic and incurred the public’s wrath rather than respect. The FSA was
also required to consult with the MOF in cases in which the failure of a financial institution
could potentially endanger the stability of the financial system as a whole. In the absence of
an infrastructure for dealing with failing banks, falling bank shares and low market confi-
dence, this meant consulting with the MOF in basically any decision to declare a financial
institution insolvent. Decisions surrounding the use of deposit insurance funds also remained
in the MOF’s domain. And, since radically different asset assessments by the FSA would have
suggested that the ministry had supported essentially insolvent institutions in the past, the
FSA was further likely to encounter an uncooperative MOF.4
In the absence of a credibly funded scheme to deal with failing banks, the process of
problem resolution necessarily remained particularistic and opaque. The pillar of solvency
support methods had long been the ‘rescue merger’, in which the MOF arranged behind the
scenes for a stronger banks to take over the operations of a weaker institution. Without an
alternative arrangement in place, the MOF and the FSA worked in tandem to secure the
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cooperation of other private sector actors in this quiet recapitalisation of ailing banks. In the
process, the MOF and FSA continued to treat each bank’s loan problems as a particular case,
despite the pervasiveness of the problem throughout the sector.
Second, the new regulator lacked credible monitoring resources to back up the newly
introduced Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) measures. The PCA program was included in
legislation passed along with the jusen bail-out legislation in June 1996 but was not put into
effect until April 1998 (for internationally active banks) and April 1999 (for domestic banks).
For the first time, the program specified actions required by banks, and these were based on
objective capital ratio standards.5   In this way, it was a scheme intended to narrow the band
of discretionary authority accorded regulators. Yet, this program relied on banks to self-
assess their assets. In the absence of both sufficient numbers of bank inspectors and expertise
in such matters, the FSA could not credibly monitor banks to ensure compliance. Further-
more, the penalty for window dressing and inaccurate disclosure to authorities remained
vague, decreasing the likelihood of compliance.
Third, the staffing of the FSA with large numbers of so-called noncareer officials led to
a skewing of the incentive structures of individual bureaucrats. The hiring process for those
MOF bureaucrats on this nonelite promotion track in the ministry differed considerably from
the hiring of those bureaucrats staffing the top decision-making posts. Those who had staffed
the Inspections Bureau in the MOF had been hired first into local Finance Bureaus after
passing lower levels of the civil service examination, and had thereafter been promoted to the
MOF central organisation. For these officials, job motivation was based largely on their
affiliation with a ministry that was perceived to be at the peak of the bureaucratic hierarchy.
Now, however, they were affiliated with an agency perceived as weak, only nominally
independent and lacking in resources. In this way, demoralised staff were a large component
of the new regulatory agency.6
In the above ways, then, change in formal regulatory structures alone failed to sever the
informal ties between banks and regulatory authorities or eliminate the ad hoc institution of
solvency support represented by ‘rescue mergers’. Key elements necessary for a real shift to
prudential regulation were missing. And, in the months following the FSA’s creation, little
deviation from past patterns of regulation or problem resolution was evident. Market
perceptions of the financial soundness of major Japanese banks and confidence in Japanese
regulators thus continued to deteriorate in the wake of this formal institutional change.
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Since the initial decision to establish the FSA, the financial system had fallen into a state
of crisis. While the banking sector’s nonperforming loan problem had been severe ever since
the bursting of the speculative asset bubble in the early 1990s, their impact on the real
economy only became clear in 1997. The failure of the nation’s tenth largest bank and fourth
largest securities firm in November 1997 pushed down the stock prices of all banks, thereby
raising the costs of capital procurement for Japanese financial institutions in both the
overseas and interbank markets. As a result, Japanese banks became cautious to an unprec-
edented degree in extending and rolling over loans to corporate clients, spurring a credit
crunch.7
Stock prices continued to fall into 1998, further weakening banks – large shareholders
themselves. Government actors were no longer able to fend off market forces due to the rising
ratio of noncross-held shares and speculative attacks on fundamentally unsound financial
institutions such as the Long Term Credit Bank (LTCB). Concern over the viability of the
LTCB – whose stock values had plunged – was at a peak and both the MOF and FSA worked
frantically behind the scenes to arrange a rescue merger. In September 1998, each agency
proclaimed support for the LTCB’s merger with Sumitomo Trust and Banking, a healthier
bank that had come forward as a potential merger partner.
From relational to rules-based regulation
The pressures bearing upon the Japanese financial system and government actors in the fall
of 1998 were such that some degree of change in the system of dealing with ailing banks was
certain. The degree of regulatory reform and transparency introduced into the regulation of
private sector finance in the October 1998 financial reforms was in no way inevitable,
however. The key to the far-reaching changes lay in the opposition parties’ capacity to seize
control of the legislative agenda in the wake of the LDP’s poor showing in the July 1998 Upper
House elections on the backdrop of the deepening financial crisis. The LDP came up with a
‘bridge bank’ scheme intended to ensure the uninterrupted flow of funds to industry despite
financial sector problems but the opposition rejected this proposal and succeeded in having
its own legislative alternatives – formulated without consultation with the MOF – passed into
law on 12 October.
The Financial Revitalisation Law and related bills established a new regulatory
trajectory emphasising transparency and universally extending resolution methods.8  In the
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process, the package also severed the informal relational ties that had become so central yet
problematic to more aggressive resolution of financial sector problems. There are four main
ways in which these reforms effected a shift in the primary orientation of government
authorities, from promoters and coordinators to monitors and prudential regulators of the
financial system.
First, the reforms transformed the particularistic institution of solvency support
represented by rescue mergers into a universal scheme for dealing with ailing financial
institutions. The legislation passed in October 1998 at last established a credibly funded
infrastructure for dealing with insolvent financial institutions of any size. Sixty trillion yen
in public funds – an amount close to that of the annual government budget – was injected into
the Deposit Insurance Corporation (DIC), enabling it to be used to support the temporary
nationalisation of banks, the establishment of temporary bridge banks and the recapitalisation
of banks nearing insolvency.9  As a result, the FSA was able to do its job without incurring
systemic risk.10  Furthermore, with the universal scheme in place, the FSA was able to move
forward and introduce stricter standards for asset assessment and loan loss reserve provi-
sions without spurring panic among depositors. A necessary element in authorising the
bankruptcies of the Long Term Credit and Nippon Credit banks in late 1998, for example, was
the acknowledgment – for the first time – that their hidden losses on marketable securities
constituted excessive levels of debt (Sasajima, Hasegawa and Fukushima 1999:7). In the
aftermath of the reforms, the agency also heightened standards for loan write-offs from 2–3
per cent to 10 per cent.11
Second, the reforms brought about further change in the legal and institutional
arrangements governing the financial system. The FSA’s tougher stance on asset assessment
was supported by legislative provisions that made disclosure of bad debts legally binding and
stipulated that banks found to have intentionally covered up such information may be
investigated for illegal activity on falsification charges. Although criminal charges of a breach
of trust have only been brought so far against the top management of failed banks, this
development alone is a notable break from the past.  In less serious cases where falsification
has not led to an institution’s collapse, the FSA has tended to order the offending financial
institution to clarify responsibility for the reporting of erroneous figures to the agency. The
FSA has further required these financial institutions to take explicit steps to prevent a
recurrence.12
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Third, the Financial Revitalisation package enacted further changes in financial
regulatory structures that served to empower the FSA. These changes included the establish-
ment of a Financial Reconstruction Commission (FRC) to oversee the FSA and assume further
responsibilities from the MOF, as well as the creation of a cabinet position to oversee the
commission (Figure 2.2). Sitting on the commission are an accountant, a former judge, a former
Bank of Japan (BOJ) official and an executive from private industry. In contrast to earlier
reforms, therefore, MOF authority was transferred this time to an entity that the ministry
could not potentially ‘colonise’.13  MOF officials sent to occupy top FSA posts received one-way
tickets, never to return to the ministry.
The FRC assumed authority over decisions concerning the solvency of financial institu-
tions from the FSA. Authority for decisions concerning the injection of funds into banks was
also transferred to the FRC from the MOF. Decisions once entrusted to the Deposit Insurance
Corporation (DIC) under the MOF umbrella were also transferred to the FRC. In line with the
heavy responsibility accorded the commission, the law requires it to issue a public report on
its activities twice a year.
The political leadership that the new cabinet post brought to the FSA has been critical
to the agency’s effective functioning since. In contrast to MOF officials who must deal closely
with politicians in the annual budgetmaking process, FSA officials need not maintain close
ties with politicians in order to carry out their work well. Nonetheless, having a minister
devoted to agency representation in the Diet has been important for a number of reasons. It
has given the agency a voice in the Diet – someone to speak out on its behalf when politically
sensitive decisions – such as those to nationalise banks – are taken.
Political representation has also helped in the FSA’s efforts to gain additional re-
sources. The first Minister for Financial Reconstruction, Hakuo Yanagisawa, made a success-
ful appeal for additional personnel resources in budget deliberations, for example. As a result,
personnel numbers were increased substantially in FY1999 and are scheduled to increase
further in FY2000 – even while numbers are being cut everywhere else in government.
Furthermore, political leadership helped pave the way for the agency’s hiring of individuals
from failed private sector institutions and elsewhere – a clear departure from traditional civil
service hiring procedures. This type of staffing, in turn, has enhanced the agency’s expertise
and credibility.14  Finally, the fact that a cabinet member heads the new regulator raises the
agency’s status to a level higher than other agencies attached to the Prime Minister’s Office.15
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Finally, the Financial Revitalisation Law and related bills effectively eliminated the
opaque ties between the MOF and banks. In the past, the ministry had been accused of
allowing its officials to be wined and dined by so-called MOF-handlers (MOF-tan) in each bank
and securities firm. Arrests of MOF officials in early 1998 on charges of accepting bribes had
further undermined the credibility of Japanese financial regulators in the eyes of market
players and the general public. The position of ‘MOF-handler’ no longer exists in private
sector financial institutions. While individuals within banks are assigned to maintain contact
with the MOF and FSA, such individuals no longer cultivate relationships with specific
individuals in those agencies. Rather than meeting individually with private sector actors
after hours, FSA officials now convene public forums for discussing key issues.16
The circumstances surrounding the FSA’s development of a bank inspection manual
illustrate the extent to which the interaction between regulators and private sector firms has
changed. The establishment of a manual in April 1999 clarifying a classification system of
borrowers and standards for loan-loss reserves and bad loan write-offs was a significant
development, but even more noteworthy was the process through which it was developed.17
The introduction of the manual followed eight months of public discussions with banking
sector officials – discussions that included the solicitation of public comments from various
business organisations and individuals. Summaries of these discussions were placed on the
FSA’s Web site, available to the general public. In the past, the forum for discussion of an
industry-wide issue such as this would have been nontransparent negotiations between the
MOF and the Bankers’ Federation.
Changes have also occurred in another aspect of informal ties linking regulators to
private sector financial institutions: the hiring of former government officials – a practice
referred to as amakudari or ‘descent from heaven’. The additional personnel costs incurred
by banks through such appointments run counter to the cost-cutting measures banks are being
pressured to undertake by the FSA. With the abandonment of the government’s implicit
guarantee of no bank failures, the benefits of maintaining such relations have also largely
disappeared. The decisions to nationalise Nippon Credit Bank (NCB) and the LTCB were
particularly notable developments symbolising the severing of such entrenched informal ties
between financial regulators and private sector financial institutions. These two institutions
long served as depositories for high-ranking MOF retirees and upon their nationalisation,




Now that the FSA is empowered to act decisively and follow up inspections with
appropriate supervision, its officials can take pride in being at the centre of the financial
sector cleanup. The Japanese media has lauded the FSA’s strengthened supervision and the
resulting public perception of regulatory competence boosts depositor confidence in banks
that pass agency inspection. This fact is important, in light of the planned lifting of the ceiling
on deposit insurance in 2002.
Banks must now change organisational conventions to complement the new regulatory
framework. This necessarily includes clarifying management responsibility, and restructur-
ing. Japanese banks have historically been top-heavy, with boards of directors made up of as
many as 50 or 60 members – few of whom were cognisant of major bank decisions.19  The FSA
has required banks to clarify which individuals assume final responsibility for bank decisions
and has urged reductions in the numbers of managing directors. Restructuring so as to boost
profitability remains a major challenge, however, and the success of government-level
changes depends heavily on improvement in the banks’ bottom line. The repayment of public
funds received in 1998 and 1999 will require better profit performance. The return of these
funds, in turn, remains politically important.
In brief, the arrangements for prudential regulation of Japanese financial markets have
changed dramatically. The FSA’s motto of ‘rule-based supervision’ (horitsu ni shitagatte
kantoku suru) contrasts with the relations-based supervision observed in the MOF where
regulatory outcomes were determined more through a process of negotiation. And, decisions
coming out of the FSA provide evidence in support of this shift. After five decades of coddling
the sector, Japan’s regulators placed two of the nation’s largest banks under temporary
government control in late 1998 and declared five smaller regional banks insolvent in 1999,
taking them into government receivership. Furthermore, for the first time, bank sharehold-
ers were forced to take losses. The unprecedented level of participation of foreign financial
institutions in the Japanese financial sector serves as further testimony to the heightened
prudential regulatory standards, clearly articulated rules and transparent administration
ushered in by the Financial Revitalisation Law and related bills.20
Implications for patterns of policymaking interaction
As the above discussion has noted, major outcomes of recent financial reforms include the shift
from relational to rules-based regulation and the devolution of areas formerly under the
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MOF’s authority to other agencies. Let us now consider the impact of these changes in
financial regulatory processes on more general patterns of policymaking interaction involv-
ing the MOF and on other finance-related areas such as fiscal and monetary policymaking.
The ability of the MOF to persist for so long in its use of informal relational ties as a
forum for problem resolution and regulation in Japanese finance was due largely to the
insulation of the domestic financial sector. This enabling condition broke down progressively
from the 1980s onwards, and the very informal nature of coordination between the MOF and
banks proved inimical to the internationalisation of Japanese financial markets. The interna-
tional market increasingly demanded information, transparency and accountability.
International market forces have not penetrated all areas of Japanese finance equally,
however. The MOF retains authority over fiscal policymaking and informal ties continue to
play a central role here. As the holder of the nation’s purse strings, the MOF maintains close
relations with the Diet. Accordingly, there are more former MOF officials elected to the Diet
than former officials from any other government agency, and this pattern has been seen
throughout the postwar period. Furthermore, MOF officials on temporary assignment
continue to occupy positions in the legislation bureaus and standing committee offices of both
houses, where Diet members are assisted with drafting bills. MOF officials regularly take up
positions in the Prime Minister’s Office, Cabinet, Minister’s Secretariat and Cabinet Legis-
lative Bureau. As in the past, these points of regular contact give the ministry numerous
points at which it can gather intelligence helpful in gauging the receptivity of elected officials
to policy proposals and gives the ministry numerous opportunities to influence the policymaking
process once legislation enters the Diet. This is particularly important in regard to budget and
tax legislation, which must gain passage in the Diet annually.
There is little evidence that heightened transparency in the area of financial regulation
has translated into heightened transparency in the MOF’s interagency relations or in
negotiations between the MOF and elected officials.21  The ministry’s continued control of the
budget means that relations between the MOF and other agencies remain hierarchical in
nature and personnel flows between the MOF and other agencies are distinctly dense.22  As
another reflection of the continued power that the holding of the nation’s purse strings brings,
amakudari flows between the MOF and the so-called public finance corporations remain
strong.23  And, while flows of former MOF officials into private sector financial institutions
have significantly decreased, these officials continue to be in strong demand in private sector
corporations in other sectors of the economy, as well as in industry associations.24
2.18
Pacific Economic Papers
In these ways, the shift away from relationally based policymaking and implementa-
tion has not encompassed the entire ministry. And, given that it is in the most powerful
bureaus (Budget and Tax) that opaque relational ties remain alive and well, there is a danger
that movement toward greater transparency in private sector finance may be impinged upon
by the persistent opacity of policymaking in public finance. Although the MOF’s authority
over the inspection and supervision of private sector finance was transferred to the FSA and
the FRC, the ministry retains control over the areas of financial system policymaking and
exchange rate policies with its Financial System Planning and International Bureaus.
Tensions between policymaking exigencies are perhaps most strong between the
International Bureau and the fiscal policy bureaus of Budget and Tax. For the international
faction in the MOF, transparency is the key to international competitiveness and pressure for
such transparency prevails from the international market and through gaiatsu or foreign
pressure. Thus, the International Bureau priorities transparency (toumeisei). In contrast, the
domestically focused bureaus of Budget and Tax priorities and focus on interministerial
adjustment and negotiation (kanchokan chosei). Even with the passage of information
disclosure laws, little transparency is likely to emerge in the process of interministerial
negotiations. Disclosure of details surrounding the final outcomes of policy decisions and the
official government rationale may be more forthcoming than in the past, but there is little
evidence to suggest that there will be disclosure of the process of interministerial adjustment
and coordination underlying those policy outputs.
Ties between MOF bureaucrats and Diet members may, in general, be less institution-
ally embedded and more pluralistic, however. In the past, a clear norm existed within the
MOF that politicians were not to be brought in to participate in intraministerial debates. The
standard operating procedure was to resolve conflict and dissent on a particular issue within
the ministry and then present a united front to outside actors on the issue. More reform-
minded MOF bureaucrats, however, have disregarded this principle in recent years, and have
linked up with politicians to push their financial system reform agendas (Otake 1999).25  In
doing so, these individuals effectively introduced some degree of transparency into the
process, with the aim of drawing on the leverage of public opinion to achieve policy goals. In
this respect, pluralism within the ministry is being brought more into the open, just as recent
partisan realignment has increasingly brought political conflict and debate out of the
backrooms and into the public arena of Diet debate.
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The MOF’s ties with the Bank of Japan have also altered considerably in recent years.
The new Bank of Japan Act that came into effect on 1 April 1998 devolved responsibility for
monetary policy to the central bank. In the past, tradition dictated that the BOJ governor
alternated between a career BOJ official and a former MOF administrative vice-minister
(AVM). The staffing of the top BOJ post by a former MOF AVM was problematic – not only in
terms of MOF influence on BOJ policy but also in terms of political influence on the central
bank. This was because every MOF AVM was well versed in annual budget negotiations with
politicians and was necessarily very political. The tradition of staffing the BOJ governorship
with former MOF officials is unlikely to continue. Today the BOJ, under the leadership of an
individual with both private sector and central bank experience, displays much greater
independence from the MOF than in the past.26  Amid concerns over the high yen in late
September 1999, for example, central banks officials clearly rejected the expressed desires of
MOF officials to carry out additional monetary relaxation.
Accountability, accessibility, transparency and fairness are all characteristics of the
new financial regulatory regime that deal with process. These attributes are not direct
indicators of broader outcomes, however – even though they have become more important
indicators in the present era of financial liberalisation where markets reward opacity with
suspicion. Heightened transparency in the policymaking process does not necessarily equate
with greater policymaking efficiency. And, the more fragmented nature of Japanese financial
authorities today arguably decreases the efficiency of policy coordination within the govern-
ment.
In the past, a single institution – the MOF – dealt with ailing financial institutions and
the injection of public funds. Today, three institutions – the MOF, the FSA and the FRC – each
have a hand in this process. The result is two-fold: more time-consuming communication and
coordination among authorities and a decision-making process more removed from direct
MOF influence.
Although the MOF was long referred to as kyoku atte sho nashi or as being more like a
collection of bureaus than a coherent agency, these bureaus were nonetheless under the same
roof in the past and led by the same cabinet minister. Final decisions concerning financial
policies were made through negotiation between the MOF Secretariat (Daijin Kanbo) and the
finance minister, with the MOF Secretariat holding a great deal of authority in such
negotiations (Author interview with official in FRC Secretariat 1999). Today, in contrast, final
decisions are made through negotiations between two cabinet ministers – the finance
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minister and the minister for financial reconstruction. In this way, final decisions are more
removed from the influence of career MOF bureaucrats. In cases when the two cabinet
ministers have had differences of opinions on policy issues, this mode of decision making has
also been more time-consuming (Author interview with official in FRC Secretariat, 1999).
The committee structure of the FRC also means that decision making in this organisa-
tion differs significantly from that mode formerly found in the MOF. Decision making in the
FRC takes place in committee meetings and career bureaucrats working on policy issues must
obtain the understanding of the four committee members and the minister for financial
reconstruction. One MOF official seconded to the FRC Secretariat stated: ‘The burden of
explanation is heavier in the FRC than it was in the MOF, where all officials had similar
backgrounds, thus making it unnecessary in most cases to explain minute details. With the
FRC, everything must be thoroughly (tettei-teki ni) explained’ (Author interview with official
in FRC Secretariat 1999). The nature of the FRC committee meetings also differs significantly
from other government-related committee meetings such as deliberation councils or shingikai
that bring experts from diverse backgrounds together. This is because each FRC member feels
that he must personally accept final responsibility and therefore final decisions fail to move
forward in the presence of any single member’s dissent. In contrast, a final report is usually
issued from shingikai even if all members’ opinions are not entirely reconciled.27  While this
process of decision making in the FRC suggests greater transparency and accountability, it
also suggests a more time-consuming process.
Conclusion
The decisive actions taken by Japan’s Financial Supervisory Agency (FSA) since October 1998
contrast sharply with the MOF’s previous eight years of policy paralysis and delay in
addressing the banking system’s huge nonperforming loan problem. These actions also
contrast sharply with the FSA’s own regulatory behaviour in its first four months of existence,
thus illustrating the limited impact of changes only at the level of formal institutional
structures. This paper has argued that the difference observed from October 1998 onward can
be traced to the shift from relations-based to rules-based regulation effected by the Financial
Revitalisation Law and related bills. This package of legislation severed the web of informal
relational ties that had long been central to financial regulation and thereby introduced
transparency into the regulatory process.
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The ripple effects of this shift from relations-based to rules-based financial regulation
are reverberating throughout the Japanese economy. Tightened regulatory standards and
government pressure on banks to dispose of their large sums of nonperforming loans have
forced Japanese banks to place greater emphasis on profits. This, in turn, is straining main
bank relationships and diluting cross shareholding ties between banks and borrowers. Bank
tie-ups across longstanding keiretsu lines are further eroding the lines of demarcation of
traditional business groups, and thereby changing the way corporations operate and obtain
financing.28  By underpinning the system with adequate prudential regulation and supervi-
sion, the FSA has set the stage for liberalisation under the Big Bang reforms to bring its
promised benefits.
While the reforms effected in October 1998 – including the establishment of the FRC,
nationalisation and bridge bank schemes, and fund injections – were intended as temporary
measures lasting through 2001, the changes embodied by the June 1998 creation of the FSA
are more permanent. In July 2000, however, the FSA will absorb the MOF’s Financial Planning
Bureau and be renamed the Kinyucho or Finance Agency (see Figure 2.3).29  Functions


















currently carried out by the FRC will then be transferred to the new Finance Agency in
January 2001, when a larger reorganisation of the central government is set to take place.30
Japan’s economic and financial problems are clearly not over. Private sector capital
investment and consumer demand have not yet taken over from government spending as the
impetus for growth. Furthermore, the Diet’s recent decision to delay the reintroduction of the
ceiling on deposit insurance protection represents a disappointing step backward in the area
of financial system reform. Nonetheless, the evidence of the past 18 months points to a
dramatic shift in the primary orientation of the nation’s regulatory authorities from promot-
ers and coordinators to monitors and prudential regulators of the financial sector.
Notes
1 The law’s full name is the Law Concerning Emergency Measures for the Revitalisa-
tion of Function to the Financial System (Kinyu kino saisei kinkyu sochi ho).
2 Notably, however, the issue did generate debate within the ministry and some in the
Financial Inspections Division were opposed to this judgement.
3 Had the FSA made such reversals in decisions upon its establishment in June 1998,
numerous banks would have gone into insolvency without a scheme in place for
managing the problem. Thus, prior to the October 1998 financial reforms, exercising
the option to change assessment criteria would have merely spurred panic and
incurred the public’s wrath.
4 Bureaucracies have a tendency to resist reversals in institutional judgments, for
doing so draws criticism – not only of those making the change in judgement but also
of those who exercised lenient judgments at an earlier time. The flow of former MOF
bureaucrats into private sector financial institutions (amakudari) upon retirement
exacerbated the inherent inertia in the MOF. Former ministry officials in positions
in private sector banks would be affected negatively by stricter regulatory standards;
yet, such individuals played a role in deciding the amakudari postings of more junior
colleagues still in the ministry. Thus, implicating one’s former boss could have a
direct bearing on one’s own future.
5 The Prompt Correction Action measures were modelled after a similar program
introduced by US regulatory authorities in 1991.
6 The media’s scepticism of the new regulatory agency and allegations that the shift of
regulatory authority to the FSA was merely a case of kanban nurikai or switching of
the signboards further undermined the agency’s credibility.
7 Major financial institutions that collapsed in this period included Sanyo Securities,
Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and Yamaichi Securities.
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8 The second package of government-proposed legislation that followed in the Diet
later in the same month was also clearly important in stabilizing the financial system.
These bills dealt with the recapitalisation of relatively healthy banks. Nonetheless,
the effectiveness of this legislation was greatly enhanced by its implementation
under the new rules of the game, established by the Financial Revitalisation Law and
related bills.
9 The DIC was established in 1971 but had been inadequately funded. Funds were
insufficient to cover the failure of even a regional bank. Under the new scheme,
regulators have three possible routes. First, the FRC can sends in receivers to assess
the condition of assets and find another institution willing to take over the ailing bank
once its condition is clarified. Second, in the case that there is no willing candidate
to absorb the problem bank, the failing institution becomes a bridge bank and credit
continues to be extended to sound borrowers until a receiving bank is found to assume
its business and customers. Third, the FRC can temporarily nationalize a bank (either
through the bank’s request or forcibly). In the case of temporary nationalisation, the
government takes all ordinary shares and the Stock Price Evaluation Committee
under the umbrella of the FRC determines the price at which shares are purchased,
based on its appraisal of the value of good assets held by the problem bank. This
committee, initially numbering five but increased to six in May 1999, is comprised of
two university professors, one lawyer, two certified public accountants and a manu-
facturing company executive. No career government officials are involved in making
judgments concerning stock prices.
10 From 15 December 1998, the newly established Financial Reconstruction Commis-
sion (FRC) has made decisions concerning the solvency of financial institutions but
from the October passage of the Financial Revitalisation Bill until this date, the FSA
assumed authority for such decisions. It was during the FSA’s period of responsibility
that the Long Term Credit Bank (LTCB) and Nippon Credit Bank (NCB) were
nationalised.
11 This shift may be interpreted as more than an acknowledgement of changed condi-
tions. The shift may also be seen as an institutional defence strategy: adoption of
stricter criteria avoided future criticism of the agency.
12 For example, in February 2000, the FSA ordered the Daihyaku Mutual Life Insurance
Company to clarify management responsibility for the erroneous reporting of its
solvency margin ratio to authorities and to take steps to ensure the disguising of its
loans does not happen again.
13 Approximately half (19) of the 37 individuals staffing the FRC Secretariat, however,
were on loan from the MOF.
14 Individuals from those institutions know well the methods of hiding bad assets.
15 The Fair Trade Commission (FTC), for example, has long been criticised for its lack
of clout and independence, and its lack of political leadership is often cited as a factor
in this.
16 In March 1998 – even prior to the FSA’s commencement of business – the MOF
announced the creation of ‘impartial and transparent forums’ for exchanging informa-
tion between the ministry and financial sector actors (Nikkei Net Interactive ‘MOF,
Financial Institutions to Exchange Info Via New Panels’, at <http://
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www.nni.nikkei.co.jp/AC/FEAT/failures/failures00263.html>, accessed on 17 April
2000). This move was in response to a string of bribery scandals involving MOF
officials and suggesting collusive relations between the MOF and individual financial
institutions. The use today of public forums is not only in contrast to the practice of
exchanging information after hours over drinking and eating. It is also in contrast to
the heavy reliance in the past by the MOF on the chair of the Federation of Bankers’
Associations in Japan (Zenginkyo) as the mouthpiece of the industry. The chair of the
Zenginkyo rotated every year among the presidents of the Tokyo Bankers’ Associa-
tion. In any given year, however, the other banks felt disadvantaged in their dealings
with the MOF, as the process of interaction between MOF officials and the federation
chair was highly opaque and the MOF’s discretionary power vast. The MOF-liaison
position in banks thus evolved largely in response to this monopolisation of informa-
tion by the Zenginkyo chair. The FSA has opened up most issues to discussion in
public forums, however, and proceedings are now transparent to all banks in the
industry.
17 With the manual, inspection standards were clarified for the first time – thereby
eliminating the frequent past practice of administrative guidance.
18 Although the amakudari link between private sector financial institutions and the
MOF has changed drastically in the last two years, banks still hire many former
bureaucrats from other agencies. Officials from the Police Agency, for example, are
often hired to assist banks in dealing with the sokaiya (racketeers disrupting
shareholding meetings) and yakuza (those in the crime world involved in such
activities as money laundering).
19 In March 1998, for example, 61 individuals served as directors at the Bank of Tokyo-
Mitsubishi (BOT-M). Although unusually large in number, the size of BOT-M’s board
reflected a long-standing problem created by bank mergers in Japan: the inflation of
executive ranks and obscuring of any locus of accountability or responsibility due to
the desire to avoid conflict among merging entities.
20 Extensive deregulation under the Big Bang financial reforms has, of course, also
played an important role in spurring this trend. Yet, it is unlikely that foreign actors
would have entered the Japanese financial market with such zeal if the credibility of
regulators and suspicions about collusion had remained unabated. In September
1999, it was announced that the Aoba Life Insurance Company would be sold to a
French holding company, marking the first sale of a failed Japanese financial
institution to a foreign company. The sale of the nationalised Long Term Credit Bank
(LTCB) to an American-based consortium of financial institutions was announced
soon after and was finalised in March 2000.
21 This could change, however, as public attention turns increasingly to fiscal recon-
struction and areas of public finance – such as public works spending – fall under
greater scrutiny.
22 Furthermore, although the MOF has lost regulatory capacity over private sector
finance, it retains policymaking capacities. Thus, the ministry remains the key
decision maker behind the ongoing financial system reforms.
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23 For example, MOF’s former administrative vice-minister was named the first gover-
nor of the institution created through a merger of the Japan Development Bank and
the Hokkaido Development Corporation.
24 In 1999 the number of former MOF officials taking up private sector posts outnum-
bered those from any other ministry or agency, at 12 (National Personnel Authority
1999). Aggregate numbers of amakudari postings from the bureaucracy into the
private sector have declined, however.
25 The former vice-minister for international affairs, Eisuke Sakakibara, is one example
of such an individual.
26 Ironically, because the BOJ no longer has a role in management of bank failures, its
influence on private sector finance has diminished. In the past, even more former BOJ
officials took up posts in private sector banks than did former MOF officials. Under
the new Bank of Japan Law, BOJ officials are no longer permitted to assume
management positions in private sector banks upon retirement from the central
bank.
27 Because the burden of individual responsibility weighs less heavily in shingikai,
dissenting members generally do not object too much (Author interviews with central
government bureaucrats, 1999).
28 Major Japanese trading companies, for example, have accelerated debt reduction
operations and other restructuring of assets, citing rising demands from creditors for
loan repayment and the change in business environment and customer relations
brought about by the merger of leading banks. See ‘Trading Houses Feel Restructur-
ing Heat’, The Nikkei Weekly, at <http:www.nikkei.co.jp/AC/TNW/Nni20000117M
Q0K2FIN. htm>.
29 In April 2000, responsibility for supervision of credit cooperatives was handed over
to the FSA from municipal governments. The FSA also faces the prospect of gaining
more regulatory influence over the agricultural credit cooperative system in the near
future. The FSA and the MAFF have shared responsibility for supervision of agricul-
tural cooperatives, but the FSA’s responsibility lies with inspection and supervision
of the Norinchukin Bank, the agricultural sector’s central bank, while the MAFF’s
responsibility lies with supervision and inspection of the prefectural and local-level
agricultural cooperatives. Current plans to integrate prefectural federations of
cooperatives with Norinchukin Bank, therefore – if realised – will increase the FSA’s
regulatory influence in the agricultural credit cooperative system, where consolida-
tion has thus far lagged far behind that in the commercial banking industry.
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FREER DISCUSSION OF PREDETERMINED AGENDAS:
REFORM AND CONTINUITY IN JAPAN’S SHINGIKAI
DELIBERATION COUNCILS
Introduction
Over the past several years the movement to increase transparency in government and reduce
bureaucratic influence over policymaking appears to have gathered considerable momentum
in Japan. The Diet has passed laws on administrative procedures and information openness
while a Cabinet resolution has mandated the establishment of a public comment system
throughout the Japanese administration. In the (northern) summer of 1999, the Diet finally
passed a series of bills to reorganise the entire system of central ministries and strengthen
control over policymaking by the Diet and Cabinet.
Amidst all the changes, efforts have also taken aim at the organisation and operation
of Japan’s elaborate system of shingikai or deliberation councils. Deliberative bodies designed
to provide private-sector input to official decision making are hardly unique to Japan, but in
few – if any – countries are they as ubiquitous, stable and closely tied to the central
departments of government (Schwartz 1998). An official survey in 1998 counted more than
450 shingikai and the related but less formal kondankai (discussion councils) (Management
and Coordination Agency 1998a). Major shingikai explore policies for industrial structure,
financial and tax systems, social security and local government and other central concerns of
government. Narrower panels consider such issues as auto racing, livestock promotion and
female juvenile delinquents (Management and Coordination Agency 1998a).
The push to reform shingikai is surprising, even ironic. Many observers, particularly
abroad, have expressed deep admiration for the networks of communication between
government and business in Japan epitomised by the shingikai. Hilton Root, for example,
writes ‘deliberative councils ... can provide a framework for the cooperation of economic actors
by limiting the government’s ability to change policy arbitrarily and, hence, redistribute




The council format facilitated bargains between constituent groups in exchange for infor-
mation needed to formulate rational economic policies. The exchanges helped leadership
evaluate policy performance and ensure policy-makers accurate information about private
sector assets and strategies. These council formats also facilitated, with varying degrees of
success, the sharing of information between firms about markets, marketing strategies,
products and new technology…Intervention [by governments in markets] tended to succeed
in nations that had effective frameworks for the exchange of information between state and
society. The East Asian governments that are conventionally viewed as authoritarian
feature a high level of consensus building and are particularly effective at reducing
information asymmetries in the economic policy dialogue. (Root 1998:69–70,72)
Sociologist Peter Evans further praises deliberation councils and other informal networks for
enabling Japanese ministries and agencies to develop a form of ‘embedded autonomy’.
Meritocratic appointments and long career paths help agencies maintain autonomy and avoid
corruption, while deliberation councils and other networks enable their officials to exchange
information freely with the private sector (Evans 1995:49). Even economists such as Komiya
Ryutaro – who gained fame for his biting criticisms of the interventionist policies of the
Ministry of International Trade and Industry – have highlighted the contributions of
shingikai. Komiya concluded that ‘whatever the defects in the postwar Japanese approach to
industrial policy, [shingikai] have been a very effective means for the collection, exchange and
dissemination of information on industry and as such have contributed greatly to postwar
economic growth’ (Komiya 1988:19).1  The World Bank’s well-known East Asian Miracle
study (partly funded by the Japanese government) also singles out deliberation councils for
approbation (World Bank 1993:181–2).
Despite this praise from economists, sociologists, international financial institutions
and consultants, shingikai have come in for withering attacks from specialists in Japanese
politics and administration. Shingikai, they charge, lack openness and accountability.
Outsiders are unable to participate or monitor council proceedings. Opaque procedures shield
discussion and conflict. Deliberation councils preempt debate in the Diet and other public
fora.
Most observers blame the bureaucrats for this sad state of affairs. Japanese ministries,
critics charge, use shingikai as ‘magic cloaks of invisibility’ (kakuremino) to obscure the
reality of bureaucratic control. Elite bureaucrats set the agendas, select the personnel – often
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former officials of the ministry itself – and draft the reports. A close observer of a major
shingikai, the Financial System Research Council of the Ministry of Finance (MOF), noted
that the council is ‘convened, sponsored, and guided by officials of the [MOF]. As a result, it
generally functions as a mechanism for legitimising proposals from the ministry itself’. As the
chair of another Finance Ministry advisory council remarked, ‘the biggest problem is that the
bureaucrats ultimately steer these various investigatory councils; no matter how many
opinions are aired, the debate invariably moves in the direction the bureaucrats think is right’
(Hartcher 1998:247–8).2  Other critics note that shingikai often serve as a site for rigai chosei
(interest coordination) among private firms. In this role the shingikai may facilitate the
manipulation of government policy to increase barriers to entry by would-be competitors, and
thereby support the maintenance of cartels. Still others lay primary blame for fostering and
manipulating the shingikai to serve insider interests on the zoku (tribe) of politicians in
Japan’s governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) who are constantly on the hunt for
particularistic benefits to hand to their constituents and campaign contributors. Most
analysts pool together bureaucrats, business interests and backbench politicians as vested
interests – three sides in Japan’s version of iron triangles. Where the World Bank sees
cooperation and communication, these critics discern exclusion and collusion.
The movement to reform the shingikai system faces deeply entrenched resistance and
raises two important questions. Have the reforms moved shingikai closer to the ideal held by
foreigners, retaining the advantages of information interchange while creating an open style
of communication less amenable to bureaucratic control? And what does the fate of the
reforms suggest about broader trends in Japanese administration and politics?
Impetus and proposals for reform
The movement to reform shingikai is embedded in larger criticisms of the Japanese
bureaucratic system. The call to ‘administrative reform’ dates back at least to 1924 when the
pioneering journalist Ishibashi Tanzan (who was to serve a brief stint as prime minister in
the 1950s) argued that ‘bureaucratic rule is only a temporary aberration of a revolutionary
era. Now ... bureaucrats should return to their role as public servants’ (Nakano 1998:299). The
first formal administrative reform council emerged in the early 1960s but had little effect.3
Beginning in 1981, the more ambitious second reform council (daini rincho) succeeded in
privatising three major public corporations. On most other issues its proposals foundered in
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the face of stiff opposition, but its 1983 report did include a call to strive for greater
transparency in the operation of shingikai (Nogami 1997:251).
Administrative reform received a boost from the weakening of LDP rule and the fraying
of close relations between the LDP and the bureaucracy, beginning with the LDP’s loss of a
majority in the Upper House in 1989 and accelerating dramatically after the party’s
temporary fall from power in 1993–94. The LDP believed that bureaucrats had cooperated too
readily with the parties in the non-LDP coalition. They also sensed that the public had turned
against the bureaucracy, following a series of corruption scandals and policy setbacks
(Mishima 1998:982). Events tarnishing the image and reputation of government agencies
included a belated response to the massive 1995 Kobe earthquake, the Ministry of Health and
Welfare’s failure to protect the public against AIDS-tainted blood, and the Ministry of
Finance’s inability to prevent the collapse of several leading banks and securities firms in
1997. The economic stagnation that had dogged the first half of the 1990s seemed about to lift
in 1997 when the Ministry of Finance inadvisably increased the consumption tax, nipping the
recovery in the bud and further eroding public confidence in the ability of the bureaucracy to
guide the economy.
Support for administrative reform emanated from several sources. General popular
support was an important background factor, but relatively passive and sporadic. Political
parties were also ambivalent. Prime Minister Hosokawa, who broke away from the LDP and
formed the first non-LDP government in decades, advocated administrative reform but
lacked political heft and fell victim to a campaign finance scandal. As prime minister from
1996 to 1998, the LDP’s Hashimoto Ryutaro pledged his political life to reform, but took a
relatively narrow, technocratic approach to reform that stressed efficiency more than
openness. A former zoku leader himself, he was often unable to overcome resistance from zoku
politicians in his own party (Nakano 1998).
More consistent support came from three sources. Academics (particularly economists
but also some professors of law), administrators and politicians provided intellectual backing
for administrative reform, proselytised for the cause and served on many advisory councils.
Keidanren, the leading business organisation, also acted as a persistent and far-reaching
advocate of reforms to reduce expenditures and increase efficiency and transparency. For at
least a decade, observers have portrayed Keidanren as declining in unity and influence, but
on broad issues such as taxes, labour and administrative reform it has proved itself relatively
unified and potent (Noble 1998:fn 82, 211). Within Keidanren, an Administrative Reform
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Group continuously monitored, advocated and publicised initiatives to increase transpar-
ency. Not surprisingly, Keidanren perceived the bureaucracy – rather than entrenched
private firms and their political supporters – to be the major obstacle to administrative
reform. Yet Keidanren consistently pushed measures that stood to undermine the privileged
position of some of its members in the hopes of creating a freer and more competitive
environment for business as a whole (Author interviews, Administrative Reform Group,
Keidanren, 11 June 1999).4  Finally, within the bureaucracy, the Management and Coordina-
tion Agency (MCA) assumed an important role as promoter and monitor of administrative
reform. When the prime minister or Cabinet issued orders to carry out various reforms, the
MCA assumed responsibility for implementation. Though the MCA traditionally did not enjoy
a reputation as a strong agency, the institutional role of overseer gave it a rationale for
intervening in the affairs of other ministries, just as MOF’s control of the budget has allowed
it to influence a wide range of policies. Like Keidanren, the MCA has the personnel to provide
the expertise and institutional continuity that politicians, citizens groups and academics
interested in administrative reform often lack.
The administrative reform movement first began to exert a noticeable if still modest
impact on the organisation of shingikai at the end of 1991. A committee coordinating the
policies of the central agencies reached an accord that shingikai should make available to the
public transcripts of their deliberations, interim and final reports and petitions addressed to
them (Management and Coordination Agency 1991). Only in cases where such disclosure
significantly impeded fair and balanced discussion or created inappropriate disadvantages
or advantages for specific parties would this principle be excepted.
A similar interministerial committee took a further step in mid-1994 under pressure
from non-LDP forces led by Prime Minister Hata Tsutomu, former Prime Minister Hosokawa
and especially the New Party Sakigake. Sakigake emerged as a group of young former LDP
representatives who opposed zoku politics and emphasised that administrative reform
should not limit itself to attainment of a ‘small and efficient government’ but should strive
to create a more open and accountable system of governance as well (Nakano 1998). The Hata
Cabinet passed the guidelines the day before it resigned. In addition to repeating the earlier,
but often ignored, injunction to provide transcripts and reports, the new guidelines called for
‘fair and balanced representation’ in selecting members for shingikai and provision of public
hearings to allow those affected by deliberation council decisions to present their opinions.
While slightly more extensive, these guidelines were still far from revolutionary. The
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interministerial committee emphasised that the guidelines did not replace previous resolu-
tions and were not meant to impinge upon the autonomous operations of councils (Manage-
ment and Coordination Agency 1994).
Much more aggressive guidelines emerged a little more than a year later in the form of
a Cabinet Resolution. Pushed by Sakigake, now a minor partner in an odd coalition
government dominated by the LDP and its erstwhile enemy the Social Democratic Party of
Japan (formerly known as the Japan Socialist Party), the resolution ordered ministries and
agencies to:
 (1) Avoid the creation of new shingikai whenever possible. Instead, promote the develop-
ment of officials with necessary specialised knowledge, hold public hearings and solicit
opinions of related organisations.
(2) Review, before the end of the fiscal year, the necessity of shingikai in existence for more
than ten years or those which have not named new members within the last five years.
(3) Set deadlines for shingikai established to address special and temporary (rinji) issues.
(4) Eliminate reduplication, if necessary, by creating subcommittees.
(5) Eliminate participation of retired officials, advisers and other former officials of
ministries, particularly as committee chairs.
(6) Make transcripts (gijiroku) and minutes or summaries (giji youshi) available for
reproduction by average users in hard copy form, databases or computer on-line
systems, or provide a formal written explanation of why proceedings are not open.
Although the resolution contained a sharper critique and more specific requirements, it also
contained two potential loopholes. First, critics noted, it drew a distinction between general
(ippan no) shingikai established to discuss policy and special bodies dedicated to dealing with
specific and sensitive administrative matters such as personnel issues and petitions by
particular parties against administrative decisions. Only the former were (in principle)
required to make public their proceedings (Nogami 1997:253). A second point attracted less
attention but provided greater space for potential abuse. The resolution drew a distinction
between shingikai and kondankai, a looser term denoting discussion groups or even social
gatherings. Kondankai differed from shingikai, the resolution claimed, because they simply
provided a site (ba) for discussion and exchange of ideas on specific administrative operations
(gyosei un’ei jou no kaigou) rather than broad policy issues. As a result, the resolution only
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enjoined ministries to ‘strive to assure transparency’ in operations along the lines laid out for
shingikai. In the wake of this resolution, the MCA began, for the first time, to conduct and
publish detailed surveys on compliance by shingikai with the principles laid out between 1991
and 1995.
The harshest and most sustained criticism of shingikai came in the July 1996 interim
report of the Subcommittee for Demarcation of Public and Private Sector Activities, one of
three subcommittees of the Administrative Reform Committee (gyosei kaikaku iinkai; the
other two subcommittees covered information disclosure and deregulation) (Secretariat for
the Committee on Administrative Reform 1997). Six economists and four business executives
dominated the subcommittee’s membership of thirteen. Not surprisingly, the subcommittee’s
interim report displayed a distinctly Anglo-Saxon orientation: administrative intervention is
permissible only in presence of market failures and even then only reluctantly, for strictly
limited time periods, and with due recognition of the possibility of (greater) government
failure. The interim report called for introducing market principles and explicit cost–benefit
analysis wherever possible, application of bond market discipline and recourse to judicial
appeal, as well as promotion of disclosure and accountability.
The subcommittee levelled a raft of harsh criticisms at shingikai, repeating the claim
that they serve as ‘magic cloaks’ for agencies and perpetuate bureaucratic sectionalism
(tatewari gyosei). To the familiar list of suggestions about balance, openness and efficiency
made by previous panels and Cabinet resolutions, it added a number of bolder or more specific
suggestions:
(1) replace shingikai with public hearings, Diet debates and referenda wherever possible;
(2) reduce reduplication and overall numbers of deliberation councils;
(3) widen membership; focus on genuine experts; include more consumers (‘seikatsu-sha’),
women and labour representatives;
(4) eliminate direct conflicts of interest;
(5) publicise dissenting opinions; and
(6) strengthen administrative function and keep bureaucrats completely away from the
drafting of reports.
The one exception to this barrage of criticism involved shingikai working on administrative
reform, which naturally was presented as valuable. While the subcommittee claimed to
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represent the public against vested interests, like the other reports on the topic of adminis-
trative reform it violated its own principles by not discussing costs and benefits, disclosing
conflicts of opinion, or presenting alternative options for the prime minister, the Diet and
society to consider. And, of course bureaucrats – in this case officials of the Management and
Coordination Agency – were intimately involved in the subcommittee’s activities, as they were
in all the shingikai of the administrative reform movement.
The subcommittee soon retreated from the lofty heights of economic theory, however.
Shortly after issuing its interim report, the subcommittee held hearings with the ministries.
In October 1996 a new election strengthened the position of the LDP. By the time the full
committee released its report to the Prime Minister in mid-December, the discussion of
shingikai had shrunk to two short and general paragraphs in background materials. The
paragraphs noted the problems of sectionalism and bureaucratic control and vaguely
suggested (kento suru koto mo kangaerareru) greater use of alternatives such as hearings and
referenda (Secretariat for the Committee on Administrative Reform:54). All discussion of
shingikai reform disappeared from the formal report.
The retreat in tone from the subcommittee’s report to the final report of the full
committee reflected a broader counterattack by zoku politicians, their constituents and
powerful ministries against Hashimoto’s overall plans for bold reform. Many authors have
seized on this as evidence that particularistic politics has yet again triumphed in Japan.5
Surprisingly, though, the attempt to reform shingikai did not end with Hashimoto’s retreat.
By 1999 Hashimoto’s successor, the deceptively amiable and modest LDP veteran Obuchi
Keizo succeeded in passing a new law on information openness, and in pushing through the
first major reorganisation of the Japanese ministries in many decades. While Obuchi’s plans,
too, came under attack for having caved in to resistance from bureaucrats and vested interests
on some important issues, they did not by any means completely abandon the attempt to
reassert political leadership and to increase governmental accountability. The laws on
ministerial reorganisation included a detailed section on reform of shingikai (Government of
Japan 1999).6  While less ideological and scathing in its criticisms than the July 1996 Interim
Report of the Administrative Reform Committee’s Demarcation Subcommittee, the new
resolution was in some ways even more pointed. In addition to repeating earlier calls to
rationalise and reduce the number of shingikai, provide material to the public on shingikai
operations, severely restrict appointment of ex-ministry officials and so forth, it introduced
a number of new and more specific requirements on both membership and operations:
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(1) reduce membership to 20 or fewer if possible or no more than 30 if necessary;
(2) avoid appointment of politicians, bureaucrats and old people;
(3) limit representatives of ‘one side’ to one half or less of total membership;
(4) increase the proportion of women to 30 per cent within 10 years;
(5) limit members to simultaneous participation in no more than three shingikai;
(6) limit individual terms to two years or shorter and a total of ten years or less after the
reorganisation of the bureaucracy; and
(7) avoid imposing unanimity on reports and include any dissenting views.
As with previous resolutions, the 1999 guidelines contained a couple of potential loopholes.
First, they allowed officials to establish informal kondankai. These kondankai were to avoid
creation of permanent rules of order and any implication that they were proffering ‘conclu-
sions’ or ‘opinions’. It was even unacceptable to say that a kondankai had been ‘established’;
rather, agencies should speak of kondankai as ‘meeting’. The danger was that provisions
intended to emphasise the informal and nonbinding character of consultative discussion
might actually provide a quasi-secret refuge from the new standards on openness for
discussions that might be as serious and high level as in the old shingikai. Second, the
guidelines enjoined shingikai from creating their own administrative organs; instead, they
were to rely on existing administrative agencies. While aimed at blocking the accretion of
bureaucracy, in practice the regulations seem likely to favour the existing ministries and
agencies since they retained independent administrative capacities that the new and
reformed shingikai would be forbidden to match.
Finally, for the first time the government announced specific plans to eliminate or
downgrade many shingikai. Under the plan drafted by the MCA, the total number of shingikai
would fall by more than half. Deliberation councils related to ‘basic policy’ would fall to 22,
including such influential bodies as MITI’s Industrial Structure Council and the telecommu-
nications shingikai of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT). Councils aimed
at implementation of laws and regulations would decrease to 42, including MPT’s postal
shingikai and the shingikai on local finances. Some councils would be allowed to run until
their current mandates expired while others would move to the Cabinet and lose their status
as formal shingikai. The MCA targeted 121 councils for outright elimination, including such
bastions of particularistic politics as the shingikai that set prices for rice and milk, adjust
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interest rates and promote the textile industry. Only four new shingikai would be added – all
of them related to the MCA and administrative reform.
Implementation
For all these bold proposals, the important question is whether deliberative councils have
actually altered their ways since criticism and orders to reform began to accelerate in the mid-
1990s. Annual surveys conducted by the MCA from 1996 to 1998 (the most recent year for
which data are available) provide the most comprehensive overview (Management and
Coordination Agency 1998a), while supplementary information on specific shingikai updates
and adds some detail to the picture.
The surveys reveal both continuity and change. Almost all councils publicised their
creation, purpose, schedule and list of topics, as well as members and their current affiliations
(although not whether they were former officials of the sponsoring ministry or agency) – but
most had done so for years. As of 1998, admittedly before release of the more specific
suggestions for elimination of redundant deliberation councils, the MCA’s figures showed
little change in overall numbers. Shingikai still numbered 212–220, while the average
number of participants remained at just over 24 per council, well over the recommended new
maximums. Some important signs of change emerge in the figures for participation. Before
the Cabinet resolution on former officials, former ministry officials accounted for a full one-
third of shingikai chairs, according to a special MCA survey in May 1995. In 1997 and 1998
the percentage of councils chaired by former officials declined dramatically, first to 9.6 per
cent and then to 3.4 per cent. The average percentage of ex-officials per council dropped from
9.6 per cent in 1995 to 7.0 per cent in 1998 (302 of the total of 4,330 members). Only four
ministries (Foreign Affairs, Agriculture, Transportation and Finance) topped 10 per cent and
even then only barely. Foreign Affairs led the list at 12.0 per cent while MITI just missed the
mark at 9.8 per cent. Sixty-four of the 152 relevant councils – including most of the major
councils for MOF, MITI and the MPT – provided hearings in which those affected by
deliberations would be able to air their concerns. The MCA provided no figures for the degree
of participation by those representing ‘one side’ of the deliberations, probably because the
proposal was not formalised until 1999; although even had it tried the agency might have
found it conceptually difficult to provide such a count.
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Some additional – if partial – information suggests that changes in the composition and
chairing of panels are real and continuing. Interviews conducted at MITI the same day that
the Administrative Reform Committee tendered its report to Prime Minister Hashimoto (16
December 1996) revealed that ministry officials were concerned to reorient the membership
of the Industrial Structure Council to expand the representation of emerging firms and
decrease that of declining industries. MITI researchers have also expressed an interest in
increasing the voice of new software companies relative to the established producers of
electronic hardware (Kuroki and Kato 1994:196–212). Similar changes were visible at the
Economic Planning Agency. In early 1999 the agency appointed members to five advisory
councils. The newly reconstituted panels were half the size of their predecessors and included
three Japanese-speaking foreigners as well as representatives of small, local and new
companies. Among the new members was the vice-president of start-up company Hokkaido
Airlines, which had recently cut prices on tickets from Tokyo to Sapporo, Hokkaido’s leading
city, to half the levels maintained by the old oligopoly of the three incumbent airlines (Nikkei
Weekly, 15 February 1999).
Finally, some indications suggested that ministries found it increasingly difficult to
achieve the appointment of ex-ministry officials to stack the advisory system in their favour.
The MPT’s postal shingikai, for instance, had long supported the ministry in trying to block
the efforts of the administrative reform movement to privatise the postal system. When the
panel’s chair, a professor from Keio University, retired at the end of 1997, the ministry
dragged its heels in naming a new chair, claiming that conflicts within the committee made
it difficult to attain consensus. As a result, the panel fell under the leadership of the acting
chair, an MPT ‘old boy’. This outcome led to bad publicity and public dissatisfaction. In June
1998 MPT announced the new chair – the head of Matsushita Electric (Nihon Keizai Shinbun,
13 February 1998 and 5 June 1998). Apparently, the recommendation of the administrative
reform movement that former officials should not serve as chairs of advisory councils had
assumed the status of a new norm.
Data on openness also show significant progress. In 1996 only half the shingikai either
held open meetings or released transcripts; that figure increased to 68.4 per cent in 1997 and
73.0 per cent in 1998 (when 28 per cent did both). Of the remainder, all but one shingikai
released minutes or summaries; the exception was a Ministry of Foreign Affairs committee
that cited the need to protect diplomatic secrets. Observers were divided on whether
summaries, which typically did not identify positions with their articulators, were sufficient
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and desirable. Some argued that only open meetings or transcripts provided the public with
a full sense of the debates and positions of members. Others countered that preserving a free
atmosphere promoted the frank exchange of opinions (not to mention the practical and
theoretical difficulties of publishing an accurate transcript of open-ended and often free-form
discussions) (Abe 1997:194–5). At any rate, by 1998 over two-thirds of shingikai provided
transcripts of their proceedings, compared to just under half (49.3 per cent) in 1996. Two-
thirds of the councils (102) posted information on their activities in data bases or Web sites.
Many provided intermediate reports (29), opportunities for public comments (33), final press
conferences (38), or other methods to disseminate information to public, including seminars
and pamphlets (25).
Although the general trend to openness has been strong, differences across ministries
remain significant. In 1998, for example, a majority of MITI’s shingikai both held open
meetings and released transcripts of their proceedings, while none of the Finance Ministry’s
shingikai did so, limiting themselves to disseminating the minutes. Interestingly, the two
main administrative reform councils (gyosei kaikaku iinkai and gyosei kaikaku kaigi) cited
‘protecting free discussion’ as the reason for releasing only minutes (one subcommittee, on
central–local relations, did provide transcripts).
The survey results released by the MCA provide evidence that the informal kondankai
are less open than shingikai, but they too are improving. There is as yet no clear evidence that
ministries are surreptitiously moving discussions to kondankai to circumvent the increas-
ingly stringent rules on transparency applied to shingikai, although the possibility remains
and would certainly be consistent with Japan’s historical preference for the informal. As
suggested in the documents prepared by the administrative reform movement and endorsed
by the Diet, kondankai tend to be more specialised and ad hoc than shingikai.7
Measures on openness released by the MCA showed some improvement. In 1996 only
19.0 per cent of kondankai either opened their meetings, published full transcripts, or both;
by 1998 that figure had increased to 30.3 per cent. Almost 90 per cent (89.4 per cent) at least
published minutes, including 25 kondankai attached to MPT, 11 under MITI’s jurisdiction
and 5 organised by the MOF.
Shingikai in action: electricity regulation and broadcasting
The vast array of subjects deliberated by shingikai and kondankai, and the immense volume
of the reports they release, render efforts to generalise about the transparency of their
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operations both difficult and hazardous. According to officials at the MCA, the ministry whose
treatment of shingikai is the most open and advanced is MITI; among the other more
advanced ministries is MPT, particularly in telecommunications and broadcasting (rather
than postal affairs) (Author interview, MCA Administrative Management Bureau, 9 June
1999). Examination of shingikai reports and interviews with participants conducted for
research into the comparative dynamics of deregulation in Japan (rapid in the case of
broadcasting, carefully measured in electricity regulation) can provide insight into the
possibilities for change. Study of the use of shingikai in these cases thus constitutes
hypothesis generation rather than hypothesis testing: if change is not observable in the
shingikai associated with MITI and MPT (outside postal affairs), then it is not likely to be
found in construction, finance or agriculture. If significant change is found, more extensive
research is justified.
While such client industries of MITI as automobiles, electronics and machine tools sell
significant proportions of their output on global markets and thus are highly attentive to
competitive pressures, the electricity sector has long had a protected, comfortable and very
large market niche. Throughout the postwar period, Japan’s 10 electric power companies
enjoyed virtual monopolies on power generation within their geographically determined
districts. MITI protected and regulated the utilities. They in turn cooperated with MITI,
investing during recessions, devoting R&D expenditures to pollution control and alternative
fuels, and building nuclear power plants to reduce Japan’s dependence on imported oil.
Electric utilities became a prime example of Richard Samuels’ noted proposition that
governance in Japan is a process of ‘reciprocal consent’ in which private companies accept
government intervention in return for support and stability (Samuels 1987).
In the 1990s the economic and technological premises of this cosy relationship came
under increasing pressure. The successful move to competition in the telecommunications
industry, combined with developments in technology that reduced economies of scale in
electricity generation, suggested that it might not be necessary to view electricity as a natural
monopoly. Extended recession and the growing strength of the yen created pressures to
reduce Japan’s ‘high cost structure’, including electricity rates that significantly exceeded
those of Japan’s main competitors. Concern grew especially intense when the exchange rate
approached 80 yen to the dollar in 1995. By early 1997 conflict between MITI and its erstwhile
prize client became intense. On behalf of the overall Japanese economy, MITI demanded rate
cuts; in response the utilities pointed to MITI’s own long-standing goals in Japan’s energy
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policy, such as energy security, environmental protection, and universal service and stability
of supply. Years of heavy investment rendered the utilities financially weak, but many of them
exerted great economic and political influence in their districts. To up the ante, MITI
implemented a ‘yardstick’ system that rewarded the more efficient utilities with favourable
rates and even threatened to break up the electricity utilities as a way of introducing market
incentives. The utilities fought back by accusing MITI of contravening the injunction of the
administrative reform movement to reduce administrative interference in the operations of
private firms (Nikkei Weekly, 27 January 1997 and 17 February 1997).8
MITI and the Administrative Reform Committee agreed on the need to reduce the ‘high
cost structure’ and they succeeding in getting the Cabinet to include resolutions pushing for
more competition and lower rates. The Cabinet resolution of December 1996 ordered MITI’s
electric utility shingikai to find ways to bring Japan’s utility rates down to the level of other
advanced industrial countries by 2001. The MCA met with MITI and other relevant agencies,
while the LDP’s Headquarters for the Promotion of Administrative Reform presented its own
report to the Cabinet in March 1997. In May the Cabinet passed a resolution endorsing an
action plan which incorporated their suggestions virtually in toto.
Once it had gained the support of the Administrative Reform Committee, the LDP and
the Cabinet, MITI announced specific policy proposals. MITI created within the electric
utility shingikai a new subcommittee on basic policies and for the first time in several years
reopened the subcommittee on the rate structure.9  The committee members selected by MITI
represented a balance among professors, journalists and other neutral figures; utilities; and
independent power providers (IPPs). The IPPs were comprised primarily of trading compa-
nies or heavy industrial providers such as petrochemical or paper companies that hoped to
generate more of their own power and perhaps sell back a bit to the electric utilities. The IPPS
received as many seats as the electric utilities, even though they generated less than 2 per
cent of Japan’s electricity. MITI prepared a model of complete liberalisation – the greatest
fear of the utility monopolies – and elicited named responses from four of the members. Three
of them were academic economists while the other was the representative director of the Asia-
Pacific Energy Forum. While MITI’s report was scrupulously balanced in presenting the
theoretical and practical advantages and disadvantages attendant upon complete liberalisa-
tion, the very form of presentation involved an open admission of pluralistic goals, options and
opinions that was previously rare in shingikai (Electric Utilities Publications 1999a:199–
252). In January 1999 the subcommittee reached a compromise involving partial liberalisa-
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tion for large users, the introduction of competitive bidding for thermal plants, and enhanced
flexibility to reduce rates. The measures were fairly conservative compared with electricity
deregulation in other countries, but there was little question that MITI utilised the shingikai
system to stack the deck in its favour and put extra pressure on the formidable electric
utilities.
Once the subcommittee had finished its report, MITI pushed ahead again. Even before
passage of the public comments law, it invited public responses to the subcommittee’s report.
Among the 59 responses, many of them quite detailed, were representations from the United
States Trade Representative calling for further liberalisation, and four complaints about the
lack of transparency and balance in selecting members, who were seen as too close to the
industry (Electric Utilities Publications 1999a). Since MITI’s goal was to pressure the utilities
to move faster, these comments were useful. MITI’s responses to the comments showed little
willingness to incorporate other ideas that would change the ministry’s agenda. Indeed, some
industry observers characterised the ministry’s ‘we’ve already considered that’ style of reply
as arrogant (Author interviews with industry actors, Tokyo, June 1999). Next, MITI selected
new members to the subcommittees. Building upon the rationales about avoiding conflicts of
interest advanced by the administrative reform movement, it removed all industry repre-
sentatives, both utility and IPP, from the electric utility shingikai, relegating them to three
slots as ‘observers’. MITI’s bold step shocked and concerned the industry (Gekkan Enerugi,
June 1999: 42–3). With the industry representatives removed, the council’s membership
consisted of 11 economics professors, who favoured MITI’s aggressive approach (if not more
so). According to people who have attended the meetings, the industry observers were by no
means completely isolated. They only had to raise their hands to be recognised by the chair.
Nonetheless, MITI’s control over the agenda and membership of the committee allowed it to
reduce the relative influence of the industry, particularly the electric utilities (Author
interviews, Central Research Institute for the Electric Power Industry (CRIEPI), 10 June
1999).
Even more than in electricity, the legal framework surrounding television broadcasting
required the regulator (the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications), to channel virtually
all policy issues through shingikai, while the ministry routinely created kondankai to
deliberate on ad hoc issues. For decades, the relationship between MPT and the broadcasting
industry was stable and profitable for all. By the end of the 1980s that stable relationship
came under pressure (Noble 2000). As with electricity regulations, the example of dynamic
3.20
Pacific Economic Papers
changes in telecommunications policy cast a long shadow, as did even greater technological
changes. A virtual revolution in digital compression and satellite transponders effectively
reduced the scarcity of the electromagnetic spectrum, loosening the traditional rationale for
regulation of broadcasting. MPT shingikai were forced to deliberate a host of new issues,
including the allocation of licenses on satellites, digital broadcasting formats, the speed of
digitalisation of signals from conventional terrestrial stations, and the number of channels
any one company should be permitted to control. Encumbered by its traditional clients, MPT
initially responded cautiously and at times ineffectively to technological change, leaving it
vulnerable to increasing pressure from MITI, its long-time rival for control of policy for the
increasingly merged field of telecommunications and computing.
A similar pattern of bureaucratic reformulation of shingikai to prod reluctant clients
is observable in the regulation of television broadcasting. The MPT stacked some deliberative
bodies with professors and, like EPA, began to incorporate some Westerners representing
new interests. Shingikai meetings remained closed and the ministry cited concern for
protecting corporate secrets and free discussion as justifications for not releasing full
transcripts, but it placed detailed minutes of deliberations going back to 1996 on the Internet.
Particularly interesting was MPT’s changing approach to the handling of conflict. Through
the early 1990s MPT’s shingikai reports blandly muffled conflicting opinions.10  In the mid-
1990s, as the Ministry strove to update policy and the administrative reform movement
affected expectations about shingikai operations, reports became much more open. A 1995
panel on the influence of multimedia on broadcasting not only admitted a split within the
committee over when to shift to digitalisation of broadcasting satellites, but also identified
the members of the opposing camps within the committee by name (Ministry of Posts and
Telecommunications 1995). The next year the final report of the kondankai on the upgrading
of broadcasting detailed the reactions of various groups to the interim report (Ministry of
Posts and Telecommunications 1996).11  In 1997 a deliberative council composed only of
academics produced a report on digitalisation that frankly revealed conflicting stances. It
reported the results of a survey revealing the existence of a variety of opinions in the industry,
and reproduced a long appendix presenting the opinions of each firm or organisation surveyed
by the committee (BS-4 Kohatsuki Kentokai 1997). It appears that the degree to which conflict
is aired reflects strategic manipulation by MPT. The ministry may stack the deck in its favour
by picking only scholars for councils that are intended to challenge existing producers, by
issuing unanimous reports when they agree with its preferences and allowing conflict to
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surface when it cannot bring the majority, particularly existing producers, along to its side.
As ministries face an increasing strain between the attainment of their organisational
missions and the wish to protect old clients, the traditional preference for consensus over
transparency seems to be breaking down.
In addition to writing specific reports, many of MPT’s shingikai regularly meet to
discuss current issues faced by the ministry. An examination of a recent meeting of the Radio
Regulatory Commission (Denpa Shingikai) (No. 825, July 16, 1999, released 31 August 1999)
provides some insight into current practices.12  Following usual practice, the meeting was
held in the ministry’s headquarters rather than an independent or neutral site. Four of the
five members attended the meeting: three professors (of law, media communications and
engineering) and the president of Kansai Electric. They conferred with at least as many MPT
officials. The group discussed a number of issues, some of them legally or technologically
complex, including the appropriate number of licenses for FM stations in Niigata prefecture
and technical results of tests on 720-line progressive digital signals and whether they qualify
as high definition. MPT officials started off with presentations to which the council members
addressed questions. Judging from the minutes, the issues excited little controversy. The
discussion consisted largely of presentations by MPT officials and answers by MPT to
questions, some of them rather elementary, from the council. The meetings, though detailed,
did not link specific individuals with questions or answers. The entire meeting lasted 67
minutes. MPT released the minutes after a delay of six weeks.
Conclusion
Despite the widespread scepticism about administrative reform, persistent efforts to in-
crease transparency have begun to exert a measurable impact on the operation of Japan’s
deliberative councils. The selection of members is now more open and balanced. Participation
by former officials of ministries and agencies has declined dramatically. New legislation
mandates the regular incorporation of public comments on proposed administrative actions
and shingikai deliberations. Meetings and reports are more open and more readily available.
Who wins and who loses from the increase in transparency? The expanded availability
of information and the broadening of participation beyond narrow circles of industry insiders
benefit the mass public, increase the ease of access by would-be new entrants and facilitate
political debate. These reforms were major goals of administrative reform, and to a surprising
extent they have been attained.
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A second, more broadly political, goal of administrative reform was to wrest control of
policymaking from the bureaucracy. Results to date suggest, however, that efforts to increase
transparency – at least in the area of shingikai – have not only failed to humble the
bureaucracy, but actually have helped to strengthen its position. The bureaucracy retains
most of the key prerogatives. It still sets the agenda for deliberation, names the participants,
handles administrative arrangements, drafts reports and replies to public comments. While
incumbent firms are somewhat checked by the new arrangements, the bureaucracy has
gained wider latitude to manipulate the expression of conflict for its own purposes. Ministries
can selectively stack the deck with reformist academics when they want changes and
maintain a significant industry presence when they want to deflect or slow suggestions for
change. Ministries can modulate the degree of disunity reflected in shingikai reports. Limits
on appointments of former officials – ostensibly a major blow against the bureaucracy –
actually may be at least as much of an advantage as a restriction, particularly when a ministry
wants to challenge industry. Former officials, after all, represent both the ministry at which
they served in the past and the industry interests for which they work at present.13
The transparency movement has thus energised ministries, enabling them selectively
to break loose from clients when their desire for maintenance of the status quo interferes with
attainment of the ministries’ organisational missions. ‘Iron triangles’, after all, are both a
support for and a constraint upon bureaucrats. If industry and its allied zoku supporters in
the Diet do not provide iron-clad political support, the ministry might be better off dumping
them and pursuing an aggressive promotional agenda of its own setting. The three major
areas regulated by MPT provide an illuminating example of the alternative possibilities. Zoku
politicians have been extraordinarily supportive of the ‘three postal services’ (posts plus the
banking and insurance products offered by post offices in Japan). MPT has thus been able to
resist with near impunity pressures from the Keidanren and the administrative reform
movement to privatise the three postal services. Broadcasting, in contrast, elicits much less
support from backbench politicians. It is also subjective to greater technological and economic
pressures for change. The more MPT resists those pressures the more antediluvian it looks
– for no discernible payback. Telecommunications rests between postal services and broad-
casting: more politically powerful and slightly less revolutionised by technology. Not
surprisingly, MPT shingikai support the status quo on postal services, articulate the case for
slow but steady reform of telecommunications and aggressively push for changes in broad-
casting even at the expense of the existing producers.
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Hartcher (1998) notes an interesting variant in the financial sector. The Ministry of
Finance has traditionally allied itself with existing banks, securities houses and insurance
firms (and, notably, against the postal banking and insurance operations). Its secretive
shingikai have represented and supported the status quo. However, financial scandals have
stained the reputation of the ministry and demonstrated that Japan’s traditional ‘convoy’
approach to regulation is increasingly inadequate to deal with changes in the global financial
system. Accordingly, many in the MOF have come to argue that the ministry should abandon
financial regulation to concentrate on its core missions: compiling budgets and overseeing
monetary policy (Hartcher 1998:24–41; 255–6).
 The bureaucracy’s ability to emerge stronger than ever from waves of attempted reform
has inspired much gnashing of teeth in Japan. Genuine reform, it seems, to many Japanese,
is doomed.14  But if we conceive of the problem not as constraining scheming bureaucrats but
as weakening Japan’s notoriously closed and particularistic style of policymaking, freeing
bureaucrats to articulate a broader vision to get out of Japan’s current morass may actually
offer some advantages.15  Analysts agree that political parties are not yet ready to take the
lead in policy reform in a more consistent way, although that could change with the
reorganisation of the central bureaucracy and possibly, an election or two down the road, the
reorganisation of the party system (Nakano 1998; Vogel 1999). At that point the Japanese
people can put their votes where their complaints are. Till then, freer discussion of agendas
set by the bureaucrats may be their best chance to influence policymaking.
Notes
1 Komiya eventually accepted a position as head of MITI’s economics research
institute.
2 The complaint came from Kato Hiroshi, chair of the Tax Committee, quoted in Tokyo
Business Today 63:10 (October 1995).
3 For a review of successive efforts at administrative review, see Nogami (1997). A
useful timeline appears in Matsubara (1999:228–32).
4 See Keidanren (1998).
5 See, for example, the works cited above by Nakano, Mishima, Nogami and Matsubara.
6 Later passed in mid-June 1999 as part of the ministerial reorganisation plan.
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7 The names of two kondankai, the MPT’s ‘Research group on systems for the
realisation of (telephone and fax) number portability’ and the Science and Technology
Agency’s ‘Evaluation committee on analysis of radioactivity’ are illustrative of this
greater specificity. Nonetheless, the breadth of policy focus of some kondankai
appeared to differ imperceptibly from those of shingikai. Examples of such more
broadly focused kondankai included the Economic Planning Agency’s ‘Research
group on foreign aid policies’, the MOF’s ‘Kondankai on new trends in finance’ or the
MPT’s ‘Kondankai to consider the fusion of telecommunications and broadcasting’.
8 Also, author interviews at the Central Research Institute for the Electric Power
Industry (CRIEPI), 9 April 1998 and 10 June 1999; MITI Energy and Natural
Resources Agency, April 8, 1998 and Tokyo Electric Power Company, December 1996.
9 Shingikai reports, Cabinet resolutions, industry statistics and other useful materials
are collected in Electric Utilities Publications (1999a and 1999b).
10 For a major example, see Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (1992).
11 The report did not, however, link firms and organizations with specific stands.
12 See <www.mpt.go.jp/policyreports/japanese/radio/90831j01.html>, accessed 10 Sep-
tember 1999; affiliations from Management and Coordination Agency (1998b:437).
13 By the late 1990s the whole system of amakudari appointments (placement of former
bureaucrats into private sector posts) came under withering public scrutiny. Thus,
the sustainability of this system was already under question.
14 In addition to the citations above, see the following article by an indignant and
frustrated Takushoku University professor (Tanaka 12 June 1999:62–3).
15 Thus, I largely concur with the analysis of Japan’s predicament articulated by
Mishima (1998), but writing a year later and with attention to the specific problem
of shingikai, I find slightly more grounds for optimism.
References
Abe, Yoshitaka (1997) Joho kokai (Information Openness), Nihon Hyoronsha, Tokyo.
BS-4 Kohatsuki Kentokai (eds) (1997) BS hoso no digitaru-ka ni mukete (Toward Digitali-
zation of Broadcasting by Broadcasting Satellites), Kurieito Kuruzu, Tokyo.
Electric Utilities Publications (1999a) Denryoku kouzoukaikaku, kyoukyuu shisutemu-hen
(Reform of the Structure of Electric Power: the supply system), Electric Utilities,
Tokyo.
Electric Utilities Publications (1999b) Denryoku kouzoukaikaku, ryokin seido-hen (Reform
of the Structure of Electric Power: the rate system), Electric Utilities, Tokyo.
Evans, Peter (1995) Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation, Princeton
University Press, Princeton.
Gekkan Enerugi (Energy Monthly) 32:6 (June 1996).
3.25
No. 301 March 2000
Government of Japan (1999) ‘Shingikai no Seiri Gorika ni kansuru kihon teki keikaku’
(Basic plan regarding the rationalization and reorganization of shingikai and other
deliberative councils) in Chuo shouchou tou kaikaku suishin honbu kettei, ‘Chuo
shocho tou kaikaku no suishin ni kansuru houshin’ (Guiding principles on promotion
of reform of central agencies), Tokyo, 27 April.
Hartcher, Peter (1998) The Ministry: The Inside Story of Japan’s Ministry of Finance,
HarperCollins, London.
Keidanren 1998, ‘For the promotion of deregulation aimed at economic revival and the
establishment of a transparent system of governmental management – basic think-
ing’, Tokyo, 20 October.
Mishima, Ko (1998) ‘The changing relationship between Japan’s LDP and the bureaucracy:
Hashimoto’s administrative reform effort and its politics’, Asian Survey 38:10, pp.
968–85.
Komiya, Ryutaro (1988) ‘Introduction’ in R. Komiya, M. Okuno and K. Suzumura, Industrial
Policy of Japan, Academic Press, San Diego.
Kuroki, Akihiro and Akira Kato (1994) ‘Shinki gijutsu no hyojun-ka: denki, denshi kiki ni
okeru kesu stadi’ (Standardization in new technology areas: a case study of electric
and electronic equipment) Tsusan Kenkyu Rebyu (MITI Research Review) 3, pp. 196–
212.
Management and Coordination Agency (1991), Gyosei jyoho koho kijun ni tsuite (On
Standards for the Openness of Administrative Information), Tokyo, 11 December.
Management Coordination Agency (1994) Shingikai-tou gaidorain sakutei no tame no
kankei shocho renraku kaigi moshiawase, shingikai-tou oyobi kondankai-tou gyosei
un’ei-jo no kaigou no un’eitou ni kansuru shishin’ (Guidelines on the Operation of
Meetings and other Aspects of Shingikai and Other Deliberative Councils, and
Kondankai and other Meetings on Administrative Operations), Tokyo, 24 June.
Management and Coordination Agency (1998a), ‘Shingikai-to no kokai-to no suishin jokyo
ni kansuru foroappu chosa kekka’ (The Results of a Follow-up Survey on the
Promotion of Information Openness and other Reforms for Shingikai and other
Deliberative Councils), Administrative Management Bureau, Tokyo, 20 March.
Management and Coordination Agency (1998b) Shingikai Soran, Heisei 10 nenban (Alma-
nac of Deliberation Councils), Tokyo.
Matsubara, Satoru (1999) Nihon risutora: gyoukaku koso saisei no kirifude (Restructuring
Japan: Administrative Reform is the Trump Card to Resuscitation), Tokyo Shoseki,
Tokyo.
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (1992) Hoso no shorai tenbo (Future Prospects
for Broadcasting), Gyosei, Tokyo.
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (1995) ‘Maruchi media jidai ni muketa hoso no
tenbo: hoso ga chukaku-teki medi a to shite hatten suru tame ni’ (Prospects for
broadcasting as it faces the multi-media age: Let broadcasting develop into a core
medium), Final report, 29 March.
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (1996) ‘Hoso kodo-ka bijion’ (A vision of the
upgrading of broadcasting), Advisory report to the director of the Broadcasting
Division, Tokyo, 26 June.
3.26
Pacific Economic Papers
Nakano, Koichi (1998) ‘The politics of administrative reform in Japan, 1993–1998: toward
a more accountable government?’ Asian Survey 38:3, pp. 291–309.
Noble, Gregory W. (1998) Collective Action in East Asia: How Ruling Parties Shape
Industrial Policy, Cornell University Press, Ithaca.
Noble, Gregory W. (2000) ‘Let a hundred channels contend: technological change, political
opening and bureaucratic priorities in Japanese television broadcasting’, Journal of
Japanese Studies 26:1.
Nogami, Shuuichi, (1997)‘Gyosei kaikaku’ no kaimaku to yukue (The Curtain Raising and
Whereabouts of ‘Administrative Reform’), Shin Nihon Hoki, Tokyo.
Root, Hilton (1998) ‘Distinctive institutions in the rise of industrial Asia’ in Henry S. Rowen,
ed., Behind East Asian Growth: The Political and Social Foundations of Prosperity,
Routledge, London.
Samuels, Richard J. (1987) The Business of the Japanese State: Energy Markets In
Comparative and Historical Perspective, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York.
Schwartz, Frank (1999) Advice and Consent: The Politics of Consultation in Japan,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Secretariat for the Committee on Administrative Reform (1997) Gyosei no yakuwari o
toinaosu: gyosei kanyu no arikata ni kansuru kijun (Standards for Appropriate
Administrative Intervention), Okurasho Insatsukyoku, Tokyo, 28 March.
Tanaka Kazuaki (1999) ‘Shouchou sai hen houan no koko ga mondai da!’ (Here’s the problem
with the bill to reorganize ministries and agencies!) Shukan Toyo Keizai, pp. 62–3,
12 June.
Vogel, Steven K. (1999) ‘Can Japan disengage? Winners and losers in Japan’s political
economy, and the ties that bind them’, Social Science Japan Journal 2:1, pp. 3–21.
World Bank (IBRD) (1993) The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy,
Oxford University Press, New York.
3.27
No. 301 March 2000
Previous Pacific Economic Papers
300 A way forward for Japanese agriculture?
Masayoshi Homna, Ray Trewin, Jennifer Amyx, Allan Rae, February 2000
(special volume)
299 Japanese foreign direct investment in the world economy 1951–1997
Roger Farrell, January 2000
298 The genesis of APEC: Australian–Japanese political initiatives
Takashi Terada, December 1999
297 Is shutting Krugman’s ‘liquidity trap’ the answer to Japan’s problems?
Dominic Wilson, November 1999
296 Japanese government–business collaboration and the operations of Japanese
corporations in Asia: A telecommunications case
Hidetaka Yoshimatsu, October 1999
295 Free trade champion? Australian views of the US crusade against Japan
Julia Lowell, September 1999
294 Governance and Australian financial institutions
Kevin Davis, August 1999
293 The changing climate for foreign direct investment into Japan
Peter Drysdale, Ray Trewin, Toshi Naito and Dominic Wilson, July 1999
292 The Japanese origins of PAFTAD: The beginning of an Asian Pacific economic
community
Takashi Terada, June 1999
291 Not just a question of multilateral free trade: Australia’s bilateral trade
liberalisation agenda towards Japan
Jamie Anderson, May 1999
290 Perspectives on Japanese investment, employment and management in Australia
Roger Farrell and Peter Drysdale, April 1999
289 Predicting banking crises: Japan’s financial crisis in international comparison
Michael Hutchinson and Kathleen McDill, March 1999
288 Japan’s financial reform Volume I
Hugh Patrick, Takatoshi Ito, February 1999
287 International trade and environmental policy: how effective is ‘eco-dumping’?
Xinpeng Xu, January 1999
286 Open regionalism going global: APEC and the new transatlantic economic partner-
ship
Andrew Elek, December 1998
285 Realism and postwar US trade policy
John Kunkel, November 1998
284 Attracting FDI: Australian government investment promotion in Japan, 1983–96
Jamie Anderson, October 1998
283 The Multi-function polis 1987–97: an international failure or innovative local
project?
Paul Parker, September 1998
282 Organisation, motivations and case studies of Japanese direct investment in real
estate 1985–94
Roger Farrell, August 1998
281 Japan’s approach to Asia Pacific economic cooperation
Peter Drysdale, July 1998
280 The politics of telecommunications reform in Japan
Hidetaka Yoshimatsu, June 1998
279 Sustainability of growth in the Korean manufacturing sector
Chang-Soo Lee, May 1998
278 Export performance of environmentally sensitive goods: a global perspective
Xinpeng Xu, April 1998
277 Modelling manufactured exports: evidence for Asian newly industrialising econo-
mies
Francis In, Pasquale Sgro and Jai-Hyung Yoon, March 1998
276 Laos in the ASEAN free trade area: trade, revenue and investment implications
Jayant Menon, February 1998
275 Globalisation
Heinz Arndt, January 1998
274 The WTO and APEC: What role for China?
Stuart Harris, December 1997
273 The APEC air transport schedule
Christopher Findlay, November 1997
272 Japanese foreign direct investment in real estate 1985–1994
Roger Farrell, October 1997
271 China and East Asia trade policy volume 4: Trade reform and
liberalisation in China
Yang Shengming, Zhong Chuanshui, Yongzheng Yang, Feng Lei,
Yiping Huang, and Pei Changhong, September 1997
(Special volume)
270 The politics of economic reform in Japan
T.J. Pempel, Tony Warren, Aurelia George Mulgan, Hayden Lesbirel,
Purnendra Jain and Keiko Tabusa, August 1997
269 Diplomatic strategies: the Pacific Islands and Japan
Sandra Tarte, July 1997
268 Interest parity conditions as indicators of financial integration in East Asia
Gordon de Brouwer, June 1997
267 Consensus in conflict: competing conceptual structures and the
changing nature of Japanese politics in the postwar era
Lindy Edwards, May 1997
266 The role of foreign pressure (gaiatsu) in Japan’s agricultural
trade liberalisation
Aurelia George Mulgan, April 1997
265 Transformation in the political economy of China’s economic relations
with Japan in the era of reform
Dong Dong Zhang, March 1997
264 Economic relations across the Strait: interdependence or dependence?
Heather Smith and Stuart Harris, February 1997
263 Has Japan been ‘opening up’?: empirical analytics of trade patterns
Jayant Menon, January 1997
262 Postwar private consumption patterns of Japanese households:
the role of consumer durables
Atsushi Maki, December 1996
261 East Asia and Eastern Europe trade linkages and issues
Jocelyn Horne, November 1996
260 National choice
Wang Gungwu, October 1996
259 Australia’s export performance in East Asia
Peter Drysdale and Weiguo Lu, September 1996
258 Public infrastructure and regional economic development: evidence from China
Weiguo Lu, August 1996
257 Regional variations in diets in Japan
Paul Riethmuller and Ruth Stroppiana, July 1996
256 Japanese FDI in Australia in the 1990s: manufacturing, financial services and
tourism
Stephen Nicholas, David Merrett, Greg Whitwell, William Purcell with Sue
Kimberley, June 1996
255 From Osaka to Subic: APEC’s challenges for 1996
Andrew Elek, May 1996
254 NAFTA, the Americas, AFTA and CER: reinforcement or competition for APEC?
Richard H. Snape, April 1996
253 Changes in East Asian food consumption: some implications for Australian
irrigated agriculture
Philip Taylor and Christopher Findlay, March 1996
252 Behaviour of Pacific energy markets: the case of the coking coal trade with Japan
Richard J. Koerner, February 1996
251 Intra-industry trade and the ASEAN free trade area
Jayant Menon, January 1996
250 China and East Asia trade policy, volume 3:
China and the world trade system
Various authors, December 1995 (special volume)
249 China and East Asia trade policy, volume 2:
Regional economic integration and cooperation
Various authors, November 1995 (special volume)
Annual subscription rate for twelve issues:
Individuals A$60.00
Institutions A$100.00
Cost for single issues:
A$15.00
A$10.00 (Students)
All prices include postage
Available from: Publications Department
Australia–Japan Research Centre
Asia Pacific School of Economics and Management
The Australian National University
Canberra ACT 0200, Australia
Facsimile:  (61 2) 6249 0767
Telephone: (61 2) 6249 3780
Email: ajrc@anu.edu.au
URL: http://ajrcnet.anu.edu.au/
